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of Management on April 15, 1972 in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of
the Degree of Master of Science in Management
My intention, in this thesis, is to examine the objectives and
actual operations of the political risk insurance program. Using
Spanish-speaking South America as a geographical data base, I describe
the environment, the scope, and the technical style of the program, then
set forth conclusions and specific recommendations.
The similarities between the evolution of the "Investment Insurance
Program," the Penn Central, and Federal Housing subsidies are striking.
They all started with shoddy staff work. Their managements either sought
to conceal or did not recognize the potentially calamitous implications of
their actions. Their crises broke on the public with little forewarning.
The government insurance program started modestly in 1948 in sup-
port of Marshall Plan countries. By 1971 it dealt only with developing
countries, coverage was extended to include nonconvertibility, expropria-
tion, war, and insurrection, and reserves of under $100 million covered
contingent liabilities ("expropriation exposure") of more than $3.5
billion. Economic nationalism which led to Chilean expropriations will
not soon subside. Expropriations are likely to occur with increased
frequency, and OPIC is carrying a high risk world-wide portfolio.
The great bulk of new investments covered by OPIC insurance would
have been made in any event. The objectives against which insurance
applications are evaluated and, thus, the actual purposes of the "Invest-
ment Insurance Program" are unclear. Though projections related to
developmental impact are included in the insurance application, OPIC
apparently does not scrutinize them carefully. The program provides a
huge potential public subsidy to American businesses operating in less
developed countries. The Executive has an obligation to demonstrate that
government acceptance of enormous contingent liabilities serves valid
public interests.
3In 1973, there will probably be a full review of investment
insurance by Congress. Large U. S. investments in extractive industries
are particularly vulnerable to expropriation. The massive intermingling
of multinational funds in large projects would appear more prudent than
bilateral guarantees. Investment insurance on lower profile projects
should be issued against strict criteria of need, with flexibility to
encourage "new modes" of investment.
Investment insurance is only a policy flowing from a basic strategy,
and, until a U. S. strategy towards South America is thought through and
clearly formulated, it is sterile to seek to establish a series of detailed
priorities on peripheral issues. This insurance may prove to be
unnecessary, even an impediment complicating the sorting out of a mature
new relationship between the United States and South America. As aid
levels diminish and the U. S. Government edges toward a less activist
posture abroad, it would be more fruitful to adopt a lower profile, let
mutual interests develop, then slowly permit a new relationship to evolve.
The structural change in treatment of U. S. capital in South
America is a good indicator of likely future trends elsewhere. Whether
they become clear in two or twenty years will depend largely on the
internal dynamics of the region concerned. The prospect that Congress
will commit the "full faith and credit of the United States" to still
greater expropriation exposure without a searching re-evaluation of
private foreign investment is unlikely.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Richard D. Robinson
Title: Senior Lecturer
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6PREFACE
My interest in criteria for government underwriting of private
sector risk developed during my assignment to the American Embassy in
Chile. When copper company renegotiations in 1969 highlighted the
tremendous contingent liabilities assumed by the U. S. Government through
the political risk insurance program, I sought, unsuccessfully, to under-
stand the process which had led to this massive government involvement.
Working on housing in the Lindsay Administration, I was unable to find
satisfactory answers to similar questions on the network of housing
subsidies.
At the Sloan School of Management I had difficulty in defining a
suitable structural framework within which to explore the issues attendant
with a government subsidy program. I did not wish to undertake a theore-
tical study or a general survey of the subject, because in my view the
actual practice is the only valid yardstick against which to measure the
utility of stated objectives and goals. I also rejected the possibility
of a narrowly defined case study on Chile, because the unique circumstances
of a particular situation limit the general applicability of any conclu-
sions. I selected political risk insurance and U. S. investment in
Spanish-speaking South America. Focus on risk insurance provides an
opportunity to examine the evolution of a significant government subsidy
program. Spanish-speaking South America provides a suitable data base in
which to examine the changing environment towards foreign investment and
the implications of these changes for the investment insurance program.
Little relevant published material is available which relates
directly to the core of my intended thesis topic. The academic community
fails to address the fundamental issues of profitability and government
criteria in a professional manner. My efforts are further complicated by
the uneven reliability of available statistical data, the special U. S.
relationship in South America, and the time constraints imposed by the
Sloan Fellowship Program. Time priorities obliged me to exclude the
important country of Brazil from this study. Similarly, I was unable to
explore in depth many significant factors which would benefit from
rigorous examination by qualified university research groups.
An understanding of U. S. dealings in the Southern Hemisphere and
an appreciation for the investment climate in South America is essential
to an intelligent assessment of political risk insurance. I treat in a
thematic, even superficial manner topics that properly are the subjects
of entire books. Readers seeking more detailed information on subjects
peripheral to the central core of this thesis are invited to explore the
sources referenced in the footnotes.
My intention, in this thesis, is to examine the objectives and
actual operations of the political risk insurance program. It is legi-
timate to question whether such a program should function on a strictly
7economic basis or exist principally to support U. S. Government political
objectives. The strategy selected should determine the shape of the
organization created to implement these policies. After describing the
environment, the scope, and the technical style of the program, I set
forth conclusions and specific recommendations.
8Chapter I
A SPECIAL U. S. RELATIONSHIP IN THE AMERICAS
The Roosevelt Era
The United States traditionally has assumed the Americas to be
within her sphere of influence. Manifestations of this presumption
include the Monroe Doctrine, the Roosevelt Corollary, and sporadic
military interventions during the opening third of the twentieth century.
After the First World War the United States replaced the United Kingdom
as the largest foreign investor in Latin America.1 U. S. holdings of
Latin American bonds and stocks almost doubled in the 1920's, 2 and by
1929 Latin America represented nearly one half of total U. S. foreign
direct investments, while South America represented one fifth.3
The depression caused Latin America to default virtually all of
its foreign indebtedness, 4 and the foreign investment climate turned
sharply downward for over a decade. The depression also brought a new
American president, who revoked his cousin's corollary and initiated the
Good Neighbor Policy. Secretary of State Cordell Hull's support, at the
Montevideo Conference, of the proposition that "no state has the right to
intervene in the internal or external affairs of another" established a
5
cordial atmosphere with Latin America, which was reinforced by Franklin
Roosevelt's attendance at the Inter-American Conference in Buenos Aires
and his visit to Brazil. Roosevelt's and Hull's suggestion that friction
and hostility might be avoided if some U. S. private investments in public
utilities and basic resources were to be withdrawn from such countries as
Mexico and Venezuela 6 contrasted sharply with the policy of previous
9administrations.
Bolivian expropriation of Standard Oil of New Jersey properties in
1937 and Mexican action against foreign oil interests the following year
tested the sincerity of the Roosevelt policy. Despite the traditional
liturgy of "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation," the President
facilitated settlements which did not favor the oil companies.
World War II altered U. S. priorities towards Latin America. The
Southern Hemisphere contained resources essential to the war effort, and
the United States spent freely to facilitate their flow. At the same
time, however, Roosevelt fixed commodity prices which prevented windfall
Latin American profits that otherwise could result from the world situa-
tion. Moreover, Latin American neutrality was unacceptable to the United
States, and intense pressure was applied in an effort to maintain the
security of the hemisphere. Ruffled local sensitivities resulted from
American counter-espionage tactics and from recruitment of some reluctant
governments to the Allied cause.
The Postwar Period
With Europe prostrate, the dollar supreme, and the Soviet Union
landlocked, the United States emerged from the Second World War with a
virtual monopoly of influence in Latin America. The reconstruction of
Europe, the impending U. S. - Soviet confrontation, and, to a lesser
degree, the China situation became postwar policy imperatives for the
United States. Latin America's demands for stable commodity prices,
lower U. S. tariffs, and more financial aid encountered indifference in
Washington. By sharply reducing hemispheric assistance so soon after the
10
war, the United States exposed herself to the charge of being an unreliable
ally.
While Marshall Plan funds flowed to Western Europe, the Export-
Import Bank financed exports at close to commercial rates to the South.
Though Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in 1944, had noted the
complimentary nature of private and public foreign lending and stated that
private investment should be part of postwar American economic policy,8
Latin Americans complained of geographic discrimination. U. S. direct
investment increased sharply in South and Latin America by 1950; in
Europe, during the same period, it played no significant role.9 The raw
statistics support the Latin American complaint, but in fact publicly-
financed reconstruction of war-ravaged Europe in the late 'forties
provided the infrastructure for massive foreign capital investment in the
fifties.
Latin American countries participated freely at the 1948 Havana
Conference convoked to establish ground rules for the treatment of pri-
vate foreign investments. Fifty-three countries signed the Charter of
the International Trade Organization, but the United States Senate
failed to ratify it, in part because of the vague protection accorded
foreign capital and the considerable rights granted to capital-receiving
countries.10 Also in 1948 twenty American nations signed a multilateral
agreement on treatment of foreign investments and earnings in Bogota.
Assurances to foreign investors were diluted by provisions which subjected
foreign investments to "the conventional laws of each country" and "to
the jurisdiction of the national courts." 1 1
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Polycentrism and the Third World
The Seventh United Nations General Assembly proved a harbinger of
a new geopolitical era. Uruguayan Senator Cusano introduced his "Right
to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources" resolution. 12  Communist
delegates vigorously supported his proposal, the Second Committee (econo-
mic and financial questions) approved an Indian redraft 31 to 1 (the
United States), with 19 abstentions, and on December 21, 1952 the United
States lost its first vote on a final resolution in a plenary session of
the United Nations General Assembly. The Latin American bloc joined the
majority of UN delegates in recommending, inter alia, that all member
states "refrain from acts, direct or indirect, designed to impede the
exercise of the sovereignty of any State over its natural resources." 13
Developing countries, while actively soliciting U. S. private
capital, publicly expressed resentment at America's heavy reliance on
private investment as a substitute for aid. The Mutual Security Program
of 1951 incorporated Gordon Gray's recommendations that "private invest-
ment should be considered as the most desirable means of providing capital
and its scope should be widened as far as possible" and that no new
assistance program for Latin America be enacted. 14 President Eisenhower,
in his inaugural address, encouraged the flow of American investment
capital abroad, 15 and subsequently appointed Clarence Randall to chair
the Commission on Foreign Economic Policies. The Randall Report
1) recommended that public aid funds be keyed to national defense,
2) sought to shift other development problems onto the private sector,
and 3) stated that "underdeveloped areas are claiming a right to econo-
12
mic aid from the United States . . . We recognize no such right." 16
By the mid-fifties the United States had done little to shore up
her "special relationship" with Latin America. A pledge to expand the
Export-Import Bank, support in Rio for the creation of the International
Finance Corporation (an affiliate of the World Bank intended to serve as a
catalyst for private foreign investment), and Point IV assistance did not
meet Latin American needs. The United States strongly supported the Inter-
national Monetary Fund's (IMF) insistence on monetary stability, and
major U. S. efforts in Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia were to this end.
The 'fifties was a turbulent decade. Former colonies became inde-
pendent, and Guatemala was an awkward counterpoint to Bandung, Suez, and
the "neutralist" bloc. The Twentieth Soviet Communist Party Congress and
the post-Stalinist surge in Soviet and Communist bloc relations with and
aid to developing countries paralleled the re-emergence of Western Europe
and China and Japan. International economic and political competition
rekindled, and, as Pax Americana proved a fleeting moment, the United
States was sluggish in adjusting to polycentric communism and polycentric
nationalism.
Latin America no longer was isolated. The search for national and,
often, regional identity became a common experience throughout the
developing world. Conservative power elites, both civilian and military,
with whom the United States often seemed most comfortable came under
nationalist attack. While America's high degree of involvement in the
area's economic life continued, U. S. political influence sharply declined
in Latin America. 17
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Prelude to the Alianza
Sputnik, then Vice President Nixon's hostile reception in Lima and
Caracas, and Soviet overtures to Brazil were hallmarks of a new phase in
U. S. - Latin American relations. A municipal government in Argentina
expropriated an American power economy,18 and baiting the gringo was
de moda. Seesawing natural resources prices, two minor recessions, and
U. S. - imposed import quotas also contributed to a disquiet which Wash-
ington no longer could ignore. Milton Eisenhower's fact-finding trip to
Latin America demonstrated the level of this concern.
Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek's proposal for Operacifn
Pan America provided the spur for swift American action. By early 1959
the United States agreed to fund a major portion of a new Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), and in the Fall the Act of BogotA provided the
basis for a more concerted U. S. - Latin American assault on economic and
social problems that had long been festering. Castro's entrenchment in
Cuba after the Bay of Pigs aberration provided further impetus to what
President Kennedy presented as the Alliance for Progress.
The decade ended with U. S. direct investments in Europe exceeding
for the first time those in South America while direct investments in
Canada outstripped total U. S. direct investments in Latin America by a
wide margin.19
14
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Chapter 2
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INVESTMENT PROGRAM: PRELUDE TO OPIC
From Infant to Giant
The House, despite objections in the Senate, included authorization
for an Investment Guaranty Program* in the 1948 Economic Cooperation Act. 1
This permitted issuance of a maximum of $15,000,000 of convertibility
insurance a year and no more than $300,000,000 over fourteen years of new
U. S. investments in Marshall Plan countries. The legislation mandated
bilateral treaties. Funds required to back fully this insurance would
reduce by an equal amount the sums available for low-cost loans under the
Marshall Plan, and a maximum annual fee of 1 percent was established.
During the fifties coverage gradually expanded to include expro-
priation, war, revolution or insurrection. The program was extended to
the rest of the world (once treaties were negotiated), and full annual
fees increased to a maximum of 4 percent, quickly to be reduced to 1.5
percent. The insurance limit rose to one billion dollars in 1959, and
When Congress authorized the creation of the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) in December 1969, it distinguished between
what were formerly called AID Specific Risk Guarantees (renamed Investment
Insurance) and AID Extended Risk Guarantees (renamed Investment Guarantees).
I shall only discuss Investment Insurance, which eventually permitted
insurance against the specific risks of inconvertibility, expropriation,
and war, revolution, and insurrection. In order to ease the reader's
already tortuous journey, I shall pre-empt Humpty Dumpty's prerogative
("When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean - neither
more nor less") and refer to the legal entity, the Investment Guaranty
Program, as the "Investment Insurance Program" in this thesis.
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legal reserve requirements fell sharply. The Senate protested each
expansion of the political risk guarantees, its objections founded on
2gut instinct, since suitable data did not exist.
The Economic Cooperation Agency (with Export - Import Bank
kibitzing), the Mutual Security Agency, the Foreign Operations Adminis-
tration, and subsequently the International Cooperation Administration
successively assumed administrative responsibility for the program during
its first decade. A lack of clear direction resulted. Of the $400,000,000
in insurance, including double counting, issued through 1959, $321,000,000
went to Western Europe.3 The Senate succeeded in excluding Japan and much
of Western Europe from further participation in the program as of January
1, 1960, and the focus shifted entirely to the less developed countries
(LDCs).
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 further liberalized the
"Investment Insurance Program," and relaxed the previous requirement that
foreign governments recognize the U. S. Government's right to subrogate
claims. The Cuban expropriations and the establishment of the Agency for
International Development (AID) under the Kennedy Administration con-
tributed to a sharp increase in insurance of new investment in the early
sixties. Congress raised the exposure ceiling to $2.5 billion in 1963
and, more important, removed any legal reserve requirement. By law all
investment insurance now became "contingent obligations backed by the full
faith and credit of the United States."
The U. S. Government issued investment insurance totalling
$1,399,069,351 during the program's fifteen years, of which $744,200,000
18
was for convertibility, $594,600,000 for expropriation, and $59,200,000
for war risk; some issued insurance was cancelled and, of $1,070,715,082
still outstanding in 1963, either in a current or stand-by status, the
great bulk covered investments in developing countries.4  It is mislead-
ing to consider total risk exposure as the amount of insurance outstanding
in each category. Earlier legislation obliged AID to total the various
types of coverage on the same investment in calculating maximum
liability. In fact, pay outs at more than face value of an investment,
while theoretically possible, were highly unlikely. The possibility of
such multiple payments was legally excluded for insurance written after
1969. Since much of the convertibility insurance initially written for
Western Europe has lapsed,5 expropriation exposure provides the most
relevant measure of maximum potential U. S. liability. In 1963, for
instance, effective U. S. insurance exposure was about half a billion
dollars, of which some was being held in a stand-by capacity. Applica-
tions for about $2 billion of expropriation insurance were pending,6 but
only a small fraction of this would be issued.
Problems of Program Administration
The "Investment Insurance Program" now deeply committed in the
developing areas, retained substantial reserves voted by Congress. It also
collected annual fees with no significant insurance claims. The sole
payment through 1964, a convertibility claims for $77,175.77 from a firm
in the Congo, actually resulted in a small bookkeeping profit for AID,
when it sold the blocked Congolese francs to a U. S. Government agency.7
There were, in fact, no clear criteria with which to estimate potential
19
risk.
The fact that U. S. firms were increasingly ready to pay risk
premiums suggested that some danger existed. In 1964 the American
Actuarial Association noted that "you are not really selling insurance. It
might look like insurance, but there is no actuarial basis. You are con-
stantly intensifying your risk," by shifting from Western Europe to the
relatively unsafe developing countries.8
It would have been unprofessional to project possible risk on the
basis of the initial European experience. Businessmen and professors were
uncertain what impact government-sponsored investment insurance, issued
after host governments had approved might have in Latin America and else-
where.9 Scholars could point to the experience of the British Export Credits
Guarantee Department which, after years of no claims, lost its entire
working capital of $36,000,000 in 1952 and had to seek Treasury assistance
to pay off claims arising from Brazilian Government action. 10  But propo-
nents of the program could take heart in the German and Japanese decision
to establish their own investment insurance programs.
AID continued to facilitate U. S. private investment abroad in
accordance with statutory as well as Executive Branch policy. AID guide-
lines for the "Investment Insurance Program" were not designed to block
potential investments. The application process was streamlined, with
heavy reliance on "letters of waiver." These letters granted approval in
principle to potential investors, before their insurance applications were
fully processed. One senior AID official scoffed at the prospect of
rejecting an investment insurance application, but he then noted that most
20
oil projects had long been automatically rejected.11  A State Department
officer associated with the program commented that investment insurance
had been issued indiscriminately, but this he ascribed to the strong busi-
ness lobby in Washington. 12
AID not only kept inadequate records on insurance exposure, but also
made no serious effort to analyze exposure by country and sector.13 More
important was the psychology that dominated government actions. Ambassa-
dors and other top officials outside the "Investment Insurance Program"
pointed to "overriding political considerations" to support new investment
proposals.
Herbert Salzman, a competent businessman appointed AID Assistant
Administrator for Private Resources in 1966, quickly became aware of the
danger of over exposure in a country and sought to take precautionary
measures. When AID decided not to approve a Kennecott Copper Corporation
application for more than $80,000,000 insurance, Senator William Fulbright
invited AID Administrator William Gaud to an executive session of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. After the meeting, Fulbright informed
Gaud by letter that he should not take action on the basis of the senators'
comments during the closed session, since the Kennecott position had not
been presented.14 After some lobbying, and direct White House pressure,15
the insurance was issued. (It is now the basis for a Kennecott claim
against OPIC for $84,600,000).
In 1968 Congress rescinded authority previously granted the
"Investment Insurance Program" to borrow $200,000,00016 during a year when
the program was adding more than $1,000,000,000 to its expropriation
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exposure.1  By June 30, 1971, shortly after OPIC officially assumed
responsibility for the program, OPIC records documented expropriation ex-
posure totalling $3,732,812,162 of which $2,473,064,604 was current. 18*
Congress, in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, authorized the creation
of OPIC and authorized the issuance of a further $7,500,000,000 of
investment insurance. A substantial portion of this already has been
committed.
Investment Insurance and U. S. Direct Investments
There are no fully satisfactory statistics available on U. S.
foreign investments. The U. S. Department of Commerce series on direct
investment, which over the years has established pragmatic definitions by
which portfolio investment is factored out, is generally accepted as the
single most useful measure of U. S. investment abroad.19 These figures
are a by-product of a "voluntary" reporting program designed for balance
of payments purposes, and off-shore financing, such as Eurodollars, by the
foreign subsidiary of an American firm, would not be reflected in the
direct investment calculations.20 Commercial bank loans and use of
financing sources such as the Export-Import Bank also would not necessa-
rily affect reporting on direct investment.21
Like GNP computations, it is difficult to establish any firm
bench-mark against which to measure changes in direct investment. Special
Commerce Department censuses in 1950, 1957, and 1966 provide bench-mark
*
This included coverage for some projected investments and for
retained earnings not yet accumulated. Subsequent to June 30, 1971 OPIC
sought to readjust some of its past statistics to reflect an administrative
decision to separate out disputed coverage of Anaconda holdings in Chile.
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years, but the figures are not precisely comparable, which minimizes the
value of close historical analysis of changes in direct investment.
Actual gross capital expenditure is far greater than measured by changes
in direct investment, since depreciation and tax accounting has a signi-
ficant impact, particularly in the petroleum industry. Indeed, individual
companies can and do vary their depreciation reporting practice. 22In
petroleum and occasionally in mining, exploration is charged off against
expenses, then it may be redefined as direct investment once production
commences. The fact that the Commerce Department is not a regulatory
agency, and the Internal Revenue Service has no access to companies'
quarterly balance-of-payments reporting, may facilitate such bookkeeping
changes. 23
To understand the significance of detailed U. S. direct investment
data, it is necessary to know the background in each country. For
example, a company may be actively pursuing a disinvestment policy, but
this need not appear immediately in direct investment figures because
local assets, including retained earnings, may not be freely transferable.
Despite the specific shortcomings of the data, Commerce Department
statistics on U. S. direct investments provide a valuable measure of
general changes in the magnitude of U. S. investment abroad over time.
Information on the petroleum industry should be treated with particular
caution. Of course these figures do not represent the present value
of U. S. foreign investments.
From 1950-1970 U. S. direct investment abroad increased 562 percent
($11,788 million to $78,090 million), with U. S. investment in Europe
23
recording the most spectacular growth, 1,312 percent ($1,733 million to
$24,471 million).24* Canada increased 537 percent, ($3,579 million to
$22,801 million) all areas except Europe, Canada, Japan, Oceana, and the
Union of South Africa increased 312 percent, and Spanish-speaking South
America increased only 175 percent ($2,227 million to $6,114 million).
During this period Spanish-speaking South America's share of world-wide
U. S. direct investment fell from about 19 percent to below 8 percent
The shift in U. S. foreign investment patterns include a strong emphasis
on developed countries, a dramatic surge in manufacturing investment,
and a sharp rise in the petroleum industry.
There is no clear, measurable correlation between investment
insurance and annual changes in U. S. direct investment. About
$3,000,000,000 of $3,732,812,162 expropriation exposure outstanding on
June 30, 1971 was incurred since 1965, more than half since 1967.25
Individual insurance can total 200 percent of the new investment, if the
provision on up to 100 percent of retained earnings is exercised fully.
It is rather common that only a portion of the investment is insured.
Particularly in large projects registered insurance may reflect invest-
ments intended over a series of years, and waiver letters may permit
initial investments before investment insurance is formally approved.
In 1970 Latin America accounted for 69 percent ($14,683 million
The following calculations are based on Commerce Department
data, including provisional figures for 1970. The 1970 total for
Spanish-speaking South America is marginally understated, since U. S.
direct investments are not listed for Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
These probably total less than $100 million. The developing countries
figure e.g. 312 percent is inflated by inclusion of the full $3,563 mil-
lion listed as "international , unallocated" by the Commerce Department.
This is not included, however, in the calculations on individual regions.
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of $21,417 million) of U. S. direct investments in developing countries.
Expropriation exposure in the area represented 57 percent of world-wide
U. S. exposure, ($2,145,644,685 of $3,732,812,162). Mining and smelting,
excluding refining and the petroleum industry, totals 12 percent ($2,481,
million of $21,417 million) of U. S. direct investment in developing
countries. Expropriation exposure in the copper, bauxite, iron, nickel,
tin, and zinc extractive industries amounts to 60 percent ($1 ,463,300,000
of $2,481,000,000) of 1970 U. S. direct investment in mining and
smelting in developing countries. This represents 40 percent
($1,463,300,000 of $3,732,812,162) of world-wide U. S. expropriation
exposure.26*
*These figures include $235,400,000 of disputed insurance for
copper in Chile which OPIC excludes from its total.
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Chapter 3
THE INVESTMENT AMBIENTE OF SPANISH-SPEAKING SOUTH AMERICA
The U. S. Presence
The United States has been a dominant element in the affairs of
each of the Spanish-speaking South American nations over the past genera-
tion. U. S. military missions have been stationed in most of these
countries during this period; U. S. aid, including funds from interna-
tional institutions strongly influenced by the United States, has been an
important supplement to these countries' local economies; and the United
States has been a prominent trading partner with all except Paraguay.
Most of these countries depend heavily on one or two exports for
the bulk of their foreign exchange, and U. S. quotas, price setting, and
commodity policies have posed difficulties for copper (Chile and Peru),
petroleum (Venezuela), cotton (Peru), meat products and wheat (Argentina)
and tin (Bolivia). U. S. efforts to support IMF criteria on monetary
policy have drawn local political criticism in various countries
including Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Colombia. The great majority of
foreign investment in the area is American, and the United States Govern-
ment generally is closely identified with American business.
Under the Alliance for Progress the United States pledged to
commit major public and private funds to a joint effort with Latin
American countries intended to attack hemispheric economic and social
problems. Although significant public funds flowed to Spanish-speaking
South America until the close of the decade, unilateral suspension of
aid in some countries, an uneven flow of new private capital, and the
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general failure to achieve ambitious Alliance goals stirred local
criticism against the United States. Congressional action to lower aid
levels in recent years contributed to the demise of the Alliance.
The largest U. S. direct investment in Spanish-speaking South
America is in Venezuela, principally in petroleum. Argentina experienced
the sharpest rise in U. S. direct investment in the sixties, (from
$472 million to $1,288 million). Colombia and Peru each have about
$700,000,000 in U. S. direct investments, as did Chile until the 1971
expropriations.
As of June 1971 OPIC expropriation exposure was $631,843,314* in
Chile, $121,805,369 in Argentina, and about $200,000,000 in the rest of
the area. Uruguay never signed an agreement to participate in the
"Investment Insurance Program," and Chile's agreement on expropriation
never was approved by the Chilean Congress, thus prompting the United
States to waive this requirement in Chile's case.
Almost all the investment insurance written for this area was
issued by June, 1968. By the end of 1971 OPIC was accepting, but not
*OPIC officials take exception to this figure, which comes
directly from OPIC's own tabulation of political risk insurance out-
standing as of June 30, 1971. This figure overstates current
expropriation exposure. The validity of the bulk of Anaconda's insurance
included in this figure is in dispute. Moreover, the July 16, 1971
Chilean constitutional reform which facilitated expropriation of copper
holdings effectively excluded the possibility that further new copper
investments or accumulated retained earnings would be covered. Apart
from copper, the $631,843,314 includes other industries in which the
option to cover substantial amounts of new investment and retained
earnings will not be exercised.
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approving, further applications from Colombia and Ecuador. Applications
are not being accepted from Bolivia, Chile, and Peru. In recent years
there has been expropriation of American companies without payment of
adequate compensation in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru, and the ground rules
for foreign investment in Andean Pact countries have given OPIC pause.
An Overview of Spanish-speaking South America
Country Population %Urban %Illiterate GNP Per Capita
Argentina 24,300,000 79 9 $21b. $871
Bolivia 4,931,000 35 68 $911m. $190
Chile 8,834,820 74 11 $6. lb. $674
Colombia 21,791,818 48 25 $6.6b. $300
Ecuador 6,194,000 46 32 $1.5b. $213
Paraguay 2,400,000 40 26 $496m. $192
Peru 13,600,000 48 39 $4b. $241
Uruguay 2,900,000 82 9 $1.6b. $537
Venezuela 10,800,000 73 24 $10.3b. $779
There has been at least one military coup in every country except
Chile and Uruguay since 1950, and political instability is common in the
area. While military regimes and conservative civilian governments
generally have enjoyed cordial relations with the United States, recent
left-wing military coups are a break in this pattern. Regional disunity
is a hallmark of an area renowned for its historical national feuds.
Efforts to form a Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) have faltered,
and the cohesiveness of the recently formed Andean Common Market,
including Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and possibly Venezuela,
is uncertain. Intra-area trade has increased significantly in recent
years, a development which could benefit the major manufacturing centers
in Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, and Chile.
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Only Paraguay has been spared serious inflation over the past
generation, and the cost of living often is a heated political issue.
Foreign exchange crises are common, except in Venezuela, and periodic
import restrictions and additional levies on foreign businesses are cus-
tomary. Many of the countries have a large foreign debt, including
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru. Frequently a country will attempt
to reschedule its debt repayment, and the existence of this burden
contributes to tight exchange control regulations.
Highlights of the Individual Countries
Argentina
In 1946 Juan Peron was elected president following a campaign in
which the U. S. ambassador publicly declared his opposition to Peron.
President Peron initiated a campaign against "foreign shackles," and
relations with the U. S. Government and foreign businessmen were testy
during his administration.1  His populist policies cost the country
heavily, and in 1953 he modified legislation on foreign investment in an
unsuccessful effort to reverse the sharp decline of new foreign capital. 2
In 1955 Peron signed a contract with Standard Oil of California to form a
mixed company; petroleum is a touchy political issue in Argentina, and
furor over this contract may have contributed to a coup in September.3
Following several military governments, Arturo Frondizi was
elected president in 1958. Frondizi strongly favored encouraging local
and foreign capital and, although he did not reverse a municipal
government's expropriation of an American and Foreign Power subsidiary,
he did arrange for the payment of fair compensation.4 President
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Eisenhower and Kennedy favored Frondizi, and during his tenure Argentina
received substantial aid; some of the first investment insurance issued in
Latin America went to Argentina, and U. S. direct investments more than
doubled.
In 1957 oil production, managed entirely by Argentinians, was one
half that of 1935.5 Faced with annual oil imports costing nearly $300
million, President Frondizi signed a series of petroleum contracts with
foreign companies. Oil production nearly tripled in four years.6 These
agreements, which Frondizi and the oil companies regarded as legal
services contracts rathe r than concessions, stirred political controversy.
There were unsubstantiated reports of bribery during the protracted nego-
tiations.7 Years later Frondizi said that he had fully intended to
renegotiate these contracts to secure better terms for Argentina once the
full investments had been made. 8  In 1962 the military removed President
Frondizi from office.
Arturo Illia, campaigning on the promise to cancel all foreign oil
contracts and to break all ties with the IBRD and IMF, was elected to the
presidency in 1963.9 Then- Under Secretary of State Averill Harriman
journeyed to Buenos Aires in an effort to prevent annulment, and
Ambassador Robert McClintock reportedly said that cancelling the contracts
"would have the effect of blocking future U. S. investments. 10 Illia
declared the contracts void in November 1963. During subsequent compen-
sation negotiations, U. S. aid funds were held up. President Illia was
reported as being "dismayed" at the oil companies' attempts to take
advantage of his government's difficult position.11
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In 1964 The Conference Board characterized the investment climate
in Argentina as poor, pointing to Illia's waning popularity, inflationary
and balance-of-payments problems, and the unilateral cancellation of
contracts. 12 The Argentinians were balking at the "Investment Insurance
Program," contending that the requisite bilateral investment treaty
demonstrated that local legislation was not considered sufficient
assurance by American investors. 13
The military government that replaced Illia in 1966 relied heavily
on the free market and on private capital, both local and foreign.14
President Juan Carlos Ongania moved swiftly to settle the oil contracts
dispute, and most companies emerged with a profit.15 He also pressed for
a new hydrocarbon law; the 1967 law permitted the government to grant oil
concessions including commercialization to private companies, but in fact
these concessions probably were less favorable to foreign companies than
were Frondizi's oil contracts. 16
Though the Ongania regime was heavy-handed, particularly in its
dealings with political parties and students, the United States main-
tained warm relations with the regime and welcomed severe efforts to
attain fiscal stability. Foreign investment, including American, quickly
increased and businessmen flourished in 1967.17 There were constraints,
however, as demonstrated by Argentina's rejection of U. S. Steel's bid to
buy $15,000,000 minority interest (and perhaps effective control) in an
Argentine steel firm.
Inflation was curbed and reserves rose, at the cost of draconian
economic policies, and another general replaced Ongania in 1970. General
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Roberto Levingston flew from his post as military attache in Washington
to assume the presidency. His dedication to "Argentinization" of the
economy eased the restraints on inflation. He implemented new foreign
investment legislation which gave preference to foreign investments
associated with local capital in joint ventures and to foreign interests
who reinvest profits in Argentina.18 He nationalized the telecommunica-
tions industry, including ITT and RCA, in September.
Still another general seized the presidency in March 1971. Prices
seemed likely to rise at a 40 percent annual rate, and oil companies, who
had discovered considerable new reserves faced new contract terms from the
government. Tighter control over new foreign investments was exemplified
by the government's harsh treatment of Dow Chemical Company. In 1968
there appeared to be agreement in principle that Dow would have majority
interest in a proposed $120,000,000 petrochemical complex. Three years
later, offered only 20 percent of equity, Dow backed out.19  The new
government position reflected an increasing economic nationalism.20
Bolivia
There had been sixty presidents in one hundred twenty-five years of
independence before 1952; no legally elected president had served out his
full term between 1925 - 1950; and there were sixty armed revolts in the
nineteenth century. Victor Paz Estenssoro's revolutionary government
nationalized the country's three largest tin mines in 1952, then the
following year dissolved the army and enacted agrarian reform.
Administrative ineptness, wild fluctuations in world mineral
prices, and political confrontations with organized labor contributed to
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economic malaise. In 1962 the GNP, in constant pesos, exceeded the 1952
GNP for the first time,21 while the price index rose from 100 in 1952 to
8320 twelve years later.22 After Milton Eisenhower had visited Bolivia in
1953 and reported that the regime was Marxist - but not communist - the
U. S. Government embraced President Paz. Over $300,000,000 in non-mili-
tary U. S. aid flowed to Bolivia between 1952 - 1964, including assistance
for the deficit-ridden nationalized tin mines. 23 U. S. assistance helped
maintain the National Revolutionary Movement in power during its first
years and indirectly permitted payment of compensation for the expropriated
tin mines.
President Kennedy, despite 0. A. S. rejection of Bolivia's Ten
Year Development Plan submitted for Alliance for Progress approval,
strongly supported Paz's "state capitalism" and increased the flow of
U. S. aid.24 Paz was receptive to foreign private capital during this
period. After unilaterally revising constitutional electoral provisions
and declaring martial law, Paz campaigned for re-election in 1964. The
U. S. ambassador and AID director frequently shared the campaign platform
with him.25  He won "unanimously" in June, following the withdrawal in
protest of his opposition, then was deposed by a military coup in Novem-
ber.
A new petroleum code in 1955 facilitated the entry of the first
U. S. oil companies since the expropriation of Standard Oil of New Jersey
in 1937. Although the total value of Bolivian industrial production was
only $56,000,000 in 1963,26 considerable foreign investment began to
flow, especially into petroleum and mining. The last Paz initiative in
35
state capitalism was the 1959 expropriation of the railroads, but
dismal state management prompted the government to return railroad
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operations to their previous owners within two years.
President RenA Barrientos provided vigorous leadership and his sup-
port from the Indian population suggested the basis for a new populist
base. Following his tragic death in a helicopter accident, military coups
occurred in 1969, 1970, and 1971. During the first "revolutionary" regime,
state control of basic industries such as petroleum and mining was
announced policy, and the important Gulf Oil operations, valued at well
over $100 million, were seized. Following complex negotiations, which
included Spanish participation and World Bank pressure, agreement in
principle was reached on compensation just before the October 1970 coup.
The second left-wing military regime negotiated a long-term settlement with
Gulf, then expropriated a new American-owned zinc mine (covered by
$16,720,000 of investment insurance issued in 1967)28 before a right-wing
coup in August 1971. The new government, while not reversing previous
expropriations, initiated efforts to attract foreign capital for mining.
Chile
Copper, inflation, and political gyrations are all intensely Chilean.
Gabriel Gonzalez Videla,elected president of Chile in 1946 by a Popular
Front, expelled the Communists from his cabinet within a year and out-
lawed the Communist Party in two. By the end of his term many of his ini-
tial supporters considered him a right-wing American supporter. During his
administration inflation flourished and copper prices plummeted. They rose
sharply during the Korean War until the United States established a fixed
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purchase price, then finally soared through that barrier. The price of
copper was a useful barometer of the country's foreign exchange prospects
and not uncommonly affected Chile's relations with the United States
and with the two principal Chilean copper producers, Anaconda and Kenne-
cott.
A squeeze on Gran Minerla profits reduced the average yield on
these two companies' assets from 14 percent in 1948 to 2 percent in
1953,29 and the companies insisted upon a more favorable tax situation
before embarking on an expansion program. By 1953 the Chilean Government,
headed by President Carlos Ibanez - who had rules as dictator a generation
earlier-, recognized that Chile's copper policies were retarding growth and
not maximizing potential benefits. A deal was struck in the Nuevo Trato
of 1955.
Prices increased 88 percent in 1954, and the following year Ibanez
invited a team of U. S. financial experts to Chile. The result was an
austerity program, in accordance with IMF principles, which slashed
inflation and provoked predictable anti-American political attacks.
Economic slowdown preceded the 1958 presidential campaign. In 1946 a
candidate elected by the left turned right, in 1952 an ex-dictator elected
as a strong man proved soft, and in 1958 an austere businessman was
running against a Marxist. Socialist Salvador Allende, losing in a cliff
hanger, blamed his defeat on the CIA.
President Jorge Alessandri further tightened the belts of the
Chilean working class, and inflation remained in check for several years.
Early in his administration U. S. copper companies offered to expand
production in return for lower taxes. When this failed, both Anaconda
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and Kennecott invested heavily instead in Montana and Utah. The United
States, toward which Alessandri acted correctly but not warmly, poured in
aid following an earthquake disaster. U. S. investment, however, flowed
elsewhere.
Inflation again took hold, and this contributed to a shift of the
political mood to the left. The two principal candidates in the 1964
presidential campaign were Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei and Socialist-
Communist standard-bearer Salvador Allende, pitting the "revolution in
liberty" against the "Marxist revolution." The United States viewed the
contest as critical for the Alliance for Progress and acted accordingly.
Copper was a major campaign issue, and Frei won handsomely. While
Frei had a broad program for reform, the key was copper. The copper
companies sensed that the alternative to "Chileanization" was expropriation.
Anaconda, though the most vulnerable, maintained 100 percent ownership of
its major mines; it and Cerro Corporation agreed to minority Chilean
Government participation in new mines, and Kennecott accepted 49 percent
interest in its existing mine. A program to almost double copper produc-
tion by 1971 was part of a complex deal that included major copper company
capital, tax reductions, Export-Import Bank loans, and Chilean investment.
In June 1971 Chile had the highest expropriation exposure,
$631,843,314, with OPIC of any country in the world. Almost all of this
insurance was written between July 1965 and June 1968, including the
record amount for any country in one year, $452,803,013 in 1968,
principally for copper.
In 1967, when the U. S. Government's optimism for its Christian
Democratic "show case" still prevailed, a senior officer of W. R. Grace
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the American company with the longest, most diverse experience in Latin
America, informed businessmen assembled at a State Department meeting that
Grace had decided that Chile was on the way to a statist economy where
business couldn't prosper. At that time Grace had actually decided to
divest in Chile as fast as possible.30 The divestiture was virtually
completed by December 31, 1969. A 1965 business report on Chile referred
to the climate of uncertainty in 1962-1964, the strong stabilizing factor
of the 1964 election, and the optimism of foreign investors by 1965 31  In
October 1967 a reliable businessmen's newsletter on Latin America reported
that the business climate in Chile was not conducive to new investment by
local entrepreneurs, much less by foreign investors.32 The report cited
political and economic uncertainties. Few new U. S. investments in Chile
were initiated after 1967.
The U. S. ambassador who went to Chile shortly after Frei's elec-
tion did not disguise his Christian Democratic sentiments. The United
States, between July 1960- June 1967, extended about one billion dollars
in loans and grants for Chilean economic and social development, making
Chile the largest recipient of U. S. assistance per capita in the Latin
American region.33 When copper prices soared to heights unimagined by
Chileans or Americans, it became increasingly difficult to justify
massive aid.
As the United States associated itself with Christian Democratic
successes, so too was it identified with Christian Democratic failures.
Frei initiated an ambitious program and, though his achievements were
considerable, by mid-term national resentment was high and the political
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opposition grew stronger. Inflation quickened, public expenditures con-
tinued upward, and there was a budgetary squeeze, despite the extraordi-
nary price of copper. One remedy was a "voluntary loan" from Anaconda and
Kennecott, despite the recent guarantee that copper taxes would remain
unchanged for twenty years.34
In 1969 the political clamor for further moves against the big
copper companies was difficult to resist. The Peruvian expropriation of
Standard Oil of New Jersey's property together with the "windfall"
profits accruing to the companies set the stage for the forced renegotia-
tion of the copper agreements in 1969. Chile obtained majority ownership
of all major producing mines, with the right of total ownership on or
after January 1, 1973.
The Christian Democratic candidate in the 1970 presidential
election backed off from Freista policies, and the United States backed
off from Christian Democracy. Socialist Allende won a narrow victory over
Jorge Alessandri, and so came the "Marxist revolution."
Allende and his coalition did not march lock step to revolution.
There were some initial excesses, but there was pragmatic realism too.
Anaconda and Kennecott were expropriated. The Chilean Governmentin
considering compensation value, claimed that book value was more than offset
by past "excess profits" and the present poor condition of the properties.
Cerro Corporation, only recently in production was treated differently, as
was Continental Copper and Steel, still in the development stage. Cerro
has not been compensated. The World Bank and the Export-Import Bank are
not approving further loans and credits to Chile, because of the expropri-
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ations without compensation. Several U. S. firms, negotiating under
duress, accepted management services contracts as part of the compensation
deal. Others accepted a variety of pay back schemes.
Copper production has fallen as have world copper prices. Inflation
is on the rise, the budgetary deficit is enormous, and in little more than
a year Allende has managed to dissipate almost all of Chile's
$345,000,000 in foreign reserves. His representatives convened in the New
York offices of the First National City Bank to seek renegotiation of
scheduled debt payments coming due. Other outstanding debt exposure
includes about $550,000,000 owed AID, about $400,000,000 from the Export
Import Bank, and $159,000,000 in World Bank funds. 35
Allende, like Frei before him, is being pressured by persons both
more and less moderate than he. He, like Chilean presidents before him,
is discovering that it is far easier to destroy than to achieve positive
accomplishments and that his political supporters are fickle in their
loyalties.
Colombia
The Columbian ruling strata are the Brahmins of South America.
Proud that the military have seized power only three times in over a cen-
tury, the traditional political parties negotiated a unique alliance under
which the Liberals and Conservatives alternated in the presidency. Ini-
tiated in the wake of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla's military dictatorship, the
National Front dissolves in 1974.
This gentlemen's agreement barely withstood a Rojas resurgence in
the 1970 presidential election and stands in counterpoint to brutal intern-
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al violence within the past generation. Social problems are staggering,
as reflected by flash points of unemployment, student strife, and political
disorder.
Colombia has been a "show case" for U. S. and other international
public funds in the sixties. The AID program, the largest in Spanish-
speaking South America, has provided over one billion dollars in economic
and military assistance between 1962-1970,36 and support during this period
from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and others
totalled at least another billion. 37 U. S. support has not been without
difficult moments; AID suspension in December 1964 in an effort to compel
application of austere IMF-approved deflationary measures prompted
Colombian President Guillermo Le6n Valencia to lash out against "foreign
dictation" before eventually capitulating. 38  Rojas remained steadfast in
his anti-American posture.
Colombia is the world's second largest producer of coffee, and a
one cent change in the price of coffee costs the country about 1 percent
of its annual foreign exchange earnings.39 Between 1954 and 1961 the
price per pound fluctuated between $0.436 and $0.88.40 Efforts at
diversification include enticement of foreign capital for a budding indus-
trial sector and the development of petroleum and mineral resources.
U. S. direct investment has risen to $691 million in 1970, of
which $334 million is in petroleum. Though U. S. firms are expected to
participate in a joint venture to exploit ferronickel deposits, to date
none of the $70,938,428 expropriation exposure outstanding in June 1971 is
in petroleum or the extractive industries.
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In 1969 the 1956 petroleum contract signed by Rojas with Texaco-
Gulf, the major U. S. oil group operating in Colombia, was revised to
increase royalties, reduce the concession area and depletion allowance,
and set a firm termination date. Subsequently there have been further
adjustments in Texaco-Gulf operations in Colombia, and the government, in
granting new exploration contracts, has pressed for direct participation
and stricter control over foreign companies.
Though the generous profit remittance terms obtained by the U. S.
consortium selected to develop ferronickel deposits reflect Colombia's
anxiety to exploit her mining resources, the government generally is
tightening the rules binding foreign investors. New regulations were being
developed to exclude private foreign capital from sectors readily adaptable
to local investment, to oblige foreign investors to display a social con-
cern, and to insist on a significant transference of technology.41
In 1971 Colombia initiated action against three American firms for
failure to abide by existing contracts or local law.42 In 1960 Chrysler
received a tax exemption for a project intended to produce 37,348 vehicles
in ten years; only 10,697 vehicles were produced, and the issue of back
taxes was raised. The government accused Hilton Hotels International of
failure to obtain the requisite legal permits and of seeking a higher
royalty than that specified in the initial contract; action was taken to
liquidate the Hilton holding. The U. S.-owned Colombian Petroleum Company
was accused of operating in violation of its written agreement.
Ecuador
During its first ninety-five years of independence, Ecuador
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experienced forty different leaders. Charismatic Jose Mari'a Velasco
Ibarra, again elected president in 1968, only completed his four-year con-
stitutional term once in his four previous elections to the presidency.
In 1970, faced with a budgetary crisis and an uncooperative parliament,
Velasco, with military support, suspended the Constitution. The military
again ousted Velasco in February 1972.
Despite substantial undeveloped resources, Ecuador remains
impoverished.43 For many years, the world's largest banana exporter, light
industry is just now beginning to develop within a predominately agricul-
tural economy.
U. S. companies discovered substantial petroleum reserves in the
'sixties and, according to Oil and Gas Journal, petroleum will be con-
tributing $500 million to the economy by the second half of the 'seventies
(twice the current national budget).44 The Government has granted drilling
rights to a number of foreign companies, and the companies' expenditures
on petroleum activities were estimated to rise from $13 million in 1969 to
$160 million in 1970.45
Velasco renegotiated the government's arrangement with the Texaco-
Gulf consortium, by far the largest, in 1969. Claiming that the 1964
contract was invalid, because the government was "illegal," President
Velasco forced a change in the profit distribution, reduced the concession
acreage, and obliged the consortium to bear the costs of a major new pipe-
line. The willingness of other companies to take over the concession
compelled Texaco-Gulf to accept the new terms.46 In addition to petro-
leum, the government is encouraging foreign participation in mining joint
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ventures, and a Japanese group is exploring the possibilities for the
extraction of copper and molybdenum.47
In 1968 total foreign investment in Ecuador was estimated at about
$150 million, of which the U. S. share was perhaps $65 million. 48 The
United States, which has provided $132 million in aid to Ecuador between
1946 and 1969, periodically has experienced difficult relations with the
Ecuadorian Government. Ecuador declared a U. S. ambassador persona non
grata in the 'sixties, and Ecuador's claim to 200 mile oceanic territorial
rights has provoked controversy between the two countries. During the
first five months of 1971 Ecuador, continuing its past practice, seized and
forceably licensed twenty-six U. S. fishing vessels within the 200 mile
limit. The United States suspended sales of military equipment to Ecuador
for one year, and Ecuador ordered the U. S. military group stationed in
Quito to leave the country.49
Paraguay
Landlocked Paraguay is the least populated and poorest country in
Spanish-speaking South America. Despite a welcome mat out for foreign
investment, the small local market and the apparent absence of significant
mineral deposits or petroleum reserves has attracted little foreign
capital. Outstanding U. S. exposure risk in June 1971 totalled $251,781,
and less than 500 non-official Americans reside in Paraguay. Between
1961-1969 Paraguay received more than $90 million in loans and grants from
the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and AID, some of these
funds helped finance the national budget, which in 1968 amounted to about
$78 million.
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Peru
Peru's "forty families," with occasional military respites, long
dominated the national government. Left-of-center APRA, despite its public
popularity, was denied the presidency, and reformist tendecies were not
encouraged. Foreign investments, especially new capital to take advantage
of the Industrial Promotion Law and the enticing 1950 copper mining
legislation, flowed to Peru. The country enjoyed an annual economic growth
of over 6 percent from 1950 to the early 'sixties.
When forward-looking Fernando Belaunde Terry assumed the presidency
in 1963, he, like some of his predecessors, stumbled over the issue of the
International Petroleum Company (IPC), owned by Standard Oil of New Jersey.
Though the U. S. Government was planning substantial assistance to his
government, his inaugural announcement that the IPC affair would be settled
within ninety days triggered a temporary freeze by AID. Kennedy's death
and a change in State Department personnel resulted in a continued freeze
for more than two years.50
Exceptional circumstances marked the IPC's acquisition and ultimate
title registration of the "La Brea y Paribas" oil fields. These circum-
stances fueled political opponents of IPC, and a partisan U. S. Government
posture further complicated the issue. Two morths after Belaunde "settled"
the IPC affair in August 1968 the military took power. In their first
days they expropriated the IPC refinery, then later other IPC installa-
tions.
The military regime headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado may
well have resented American aid suspension and withholding of diplomatic
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recognition at the time of the 1962 military takeover. U. S. efforts to
block Peruvian purchase of Mirage planes also rankled. Velasco's immediate
concern, however, was to prevent the "special case" of IPC from forcing a
stark confrontation with the United States Government and foreign investors.
More than three years later no compensation is in the offing, the Hicken-
looper Amendment is not imposed nor the U. S. sugar import quota revoked,
and the issue is off the front pages.
The Velasco Government has initiated major economic and social
changes. A record balance of payments surplus helped it weather the ini-
tial suspension of international capital flows, as the World Bank and
Inter-American Development Bank, together with the international financial
community, stepped to the side lines. A series of expropriations of U. S.
companies further shattered the local investment climate. But, as the no
compensation policy towards IPC did appear to be a "special case," business
negotiations again seemed possible. Transactions, however, were conducted
under government coercion. ITT sold its telephone operations and invested
in the hotel business and in an equipment plant.51 W. R. Grace "offered"
some of its properties for sale, throwing a management services contract
into the deal. 52 The Peruvian Government reportedly bought out Chase
Manhattan's share in the Banco Continental for three times the 1964 pur-
chase price.53 Then finally U. S. bankers agreed to roll over outstanding
Peruvian debt. 54
New Peruvian legislation encouraged joint ventures, especially with
the government, and established partial divestiture procedures for foreign
firms. In industrial companies employees were gradually to accumulate
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company stock.55
Before the 1968 military takeover, U. S. copper companies had
ambitious expansion plans by which they would more than double Peru's cop-
per production. Negotiations stretched out with the Velasco regime, but
new mining legislation together with the difficulties of obtaining massive
international financing ultimately brought these plans to naught. There
were reports that Belgian, and perhaps British and Canadian capital, might
participate in new copper programs.56
In the immediate aftermath of the IPC seizure, no foreign petroleum
companies accepted the military regime's offer to enter into operating
contracts with the government oil company. In 1971, however, seven com-
panies signed such contracts with Petroperu and more were expected. 57 The
basic conditions call for each company to drill a minimum of ten explora-
tory wells within seven years, each expending about $40 million. If wells
are brought into production, the crude will be shared 50-50, or 52-48 for
Petroperu above a specified volume, with only minor taxes.
There have been no further annual AID appropriations for Peru since
the IPC expropriation. Mrs. Nixon, when she accompanied emergency
shipments of earthquake relief to Lima in 1970, received a friendly recep-
tion, in contrast to then-Vice President Nixon's San Marcos University
visit in 1958. The Peruvians never accepted the expropriation portion of
the "Investment Insurance Program," thus OPIC has no expropriation exposure
in Peru.
Uruguay
Vicious inflation, an outrageous pension program, a mammoth
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government bureaucracy, and low productivity have brought this once
delightful country to the edge of bankruptcy. Swift and Armour closed
down their huge meat packing plants in 1957, after losing money for
several years. U. S. direct investment in Uruguay has declined over the
past twenty years. U. S. aid to Uruguay over the past decade has been
relatively modest, and the Uruguayan Government has refused to sign the
bilateral agreement requisite for U. S. investment insurance.
Venezuela
The first popularly elected president to complete his term in office
achieved this singular distinction in 1963. The country's previous arbi-
trary and often venal tradition of government impeded the development of a
professional cadre of civil servants. Vindictive policies forced many
political leaders to choose between safety abroad or possible detention at
home. The military became accustomed to a privileged status, and it has
been a delicate task to establish civilian authority throughout all sectors
of the government.
Petroleum provides about 93 percent of Venezuela's foreign exchange,
and oil taxes and royalties furnish nearly two-thirds of the government's
income. Venezuela enjoys the highest per capita income in Latin America
because of its oil. The fact that the petroleum industry only employs
about 1 percent of the labor force poses serious problems of employment
and of equitable income distribution.
For years foreigners ran the petroleum industry with little inter-
ference from Venezuelans. In the mid-fifties, oil companies, dealing
personally with then-dictator Marcos Pe'rez Jim6nez, arranged approval for
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a major expansion. Some oil company cash payments ended up in Swiss
banks rather than in the national treasury. A revenue gap soon after
Jimenez's ouster prompted his military successors to increase the tax
levy on oil. In 1959 a civilian government effected legislation to ban
future oil concessions and further squeezed the companies. Exploration
then fell off precipitously, and of $13 billion spent world-wide on
petroleum development from 1960 to 1965, only $200 million was committed
to Venezuela.58
The same phenomenon occurred in the iron ore industry, the country's
second largest producer of foreign exchange. Retroactive taxes demanded
in 1960 together with a pricing dispute increased short-term government
revenue at the cost of expansion investment, and exports actually
declined during part of the decade.
In 1967 the Venezuelan Congress approved petroleum service contracts,
and four years later the first contracts were let for exploration in Lake
Maracaibo. The maximum length is twenty years, and the government
petroleum company reserves the right to buy an equity stake. In 1970 a
further retroactive tax hike gave Venezuela the highest petroleum tax rate,
with the lowest yield per well, of any major oil-exporting country. The
oil reversion law of 1971 requires that, when 75 percent of the existing
concessions expire in 1983-1984, oil companies turn over all their equip-
ment and installations to the state entirely without compensation.
Since 1960 the manufacturing sector has expanded rapidly with the
assistance of foreign capital and management. Insistence on a joint
venture, together with uncertain markets, however, has postponed the
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development of a petrochemical complex. The principle of a maximum
49 percent foreign ownership may spread rapidly.59
Economic nationalism is strong in Venezuela, and President Rafael
Caldera has boosted his popularity by his tough policy on foreign control. 60
In recent years the domestic political struggle over foreign private
investment has been heated. As the 1973 presidential campaign approaches
further restrictions on private foreign investment seem likely.
Although the United States does not provide significant direct
financial assistance to Venezuela, its policies strongly effect the Vene-
zuelan economy. U. S. oil quotas established in 1959 favor Canadian and
Mexican petroleum imports over Venezuelan, and Venezuela's revenues suffered
during an easing of the world petroleum demand in 1960-1961. U. S.
environmental controls against high sulphur oil also can deny to Venezuela
a valuable market or further raise the cost of its already relatively
expensive crude. U. S. direct investments of $2,696 million in Venezuela
are the largest in South America, and manufacturing investment has nearly
tripled during the past decade. Venezuela is an important hard currency
trading partner, and its continued development provides a market for Ameri-
can capital goods.61 U. S. expropriation exposure outstanding with OPIC as
of June 1971 was a relatively modest $55,930,999.
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Chapter 4
ELEMENTS IN THE CHANGING SHAPE OF LOCAL DEVELOPMENT
The ECLA Overview
The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)
and its original mentor, Dr. Raul Prebisch, have strongly influenced think-
ing on the process of development in Latin America. The fear or economic
exploitation and external political domination is in large part the product
of historical experience in various Latin American countries. A residue
of suspicion permeates the ECLA view of private foreign capital, and this
feeling extends to bilateral assistance, though to a lesser degree.
According to the ECLA schema, foreign investment is much overrated
as a source of capital.2 Foreign funds have financed less than 10 percent
of total Latin American investments during the past decade, and more stable
international commodity markets would provide Latin America significantly
more foreign exchange. Dr. Prebisch contends that the net inflow of funds
from abroad has progressively diminished, and in many cases a net outflow
of resources occurs long before essential changes in Latin American countries
are affected.3 He believes that, if the burden of financial remittances
were eased, it would not be necessary to obtain a larger gross inflow of
foreign capital than was achieved in 1966-1968.4 A complimentary argument
is that the net transfer of real resources flowing from foreign investment
is substantially less than the increase in equity, since additional invest-
ment is often financed, at least in part, with locally retained earnings
and from local banks.
The ECLA position is that foreign private investment should help to
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overcome the technological and financial handicaps of Latin American enter-
prise, rather than contribute to their perpetuation.6 Prebisch believes
that Latin America can expand its industrial exports at an annual rate of
15 percent. He believes that local association with foreign private enter-
prise -- in import substitution industries and especially in export-oriented
industries -- would be valuable in cases where the technology is not readily
accessible or where heavy investment is required.7 However, foreign
exploitation of natural resources and participation in areas such as banking
and public utilities could prove dangerous. 8
The state is considered principally responsible for certain types of
investment, though in many case joint ventures would be permissible. Foreign
takeover would be opposed for enterprises which, in national hands, use
technologies already available or easily accessible. Moreover, in Prebisch's
view, if there are national enterprises capable of such activities, it is
preferable to give them international loans with lengthy amortization and an
interest rate lower than likely profits. 9
Prebisch looks to the cooperation of international credit institu-
tions, together with bilateral assistance, to alleviate the "external
bottleneck."10 To limit external payments to what is "absolutely necessary,"
he prefers low interest international credit, unless investors are willing
to limit their remittances abroad and to reinvest their profits during an
extended period. Heavy amortization and debt repayment together with
flight of domestic capital overseas makes it essential to stretch out the
amortization period, "adjusting it to the capacity for external payment."
Such institutions as the World Bank and Inter-American Development, accord-
ing to the ECLA scenario, are expected to provide massive social and state
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industry capital, hopefully at the 2 percent interest rate recommended in
the Pearson Report.
Increasing Restrictions on Foreign Investors
Virtually every country in the world, including the United States,
places some restrictions on foreign investment. In many South American
countries basic industries such as oil extraction, mining, public utilities,
communications, and banking and insurance increasinqly are being
placed into the public sector. More selective criteria are being employed
to direct foreign investment towards capital intensive or high technology
areas. There is a greater reluctance to pay for royalties or patents that
do not transfer technology, and discrimination is evident in favor of the
local investor.
In the past foreign firms financed many of their short-term opera-
tions through local borrowing, and often enjoyed better access to credit
than did businessmen of the host country. Strict limits now exist on such
borrowing in most South American countries. There had been a proliferation
of foreign companies in some industries. This situation is now being
rationalized, as evidenced by the consolidation of auto construction and
assembly operations.
Overt economic nationalism is on the increase in Bolivia, Chile, Peru,
and Venezuela and remains potent in Colombia, Argentina, and even Ecuador.
The result is a change in the foreign investment ground rules that had
previously obtained.
One manifestation is direct government participation in a broad
range of business enterprises. This is not a new departure. State develop-
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ment or industrial agencies have functioned for over a generation in
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. Now, their activities
range far beyond the basic industries. State enterprises are not prepond-
erant in any country, save for a few sectors. They tend to participate
with private (and, on occasion, foreign) investors, in some instances
providing technical services to the private sector for a fee. 12
Multinational and Institutional Financing
The World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and Export-Import
Bank have provided major resources to South America, The World Bank,
applying conservative banking criteria, supports productive projects. The
IDB, especially through its Social Progress Trust Fund, specializes in
infrastructure needs. The Ex - Im provides credit for American
exports.
One common complaint is that these institutions are responsive to
U. S. policy considerations, a charge given substance by the strong U. S.
minority position in the first two and total control of the third. At
one time the World Bank clearly denied loans to countries that had engaged
in expropriating foreign properties without arranging compensation in a
reasonable time.13 There was further tangental evidence that the United
States could block specific loans. Recently, however, the World Bank, on
Bolivia and Guyana, in the face of U. S. abstentions approved loans to
countries that had unsettled questions of compensation for expropriated
properties.14 In the IDB the U. S. representative on occasion tabled
indefinitely a specific loan application, and Ex - Im is a direct agency
of the U. S. Government.
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The forementioned institutions do not provide equity capital, nor
do they specialize in the private sector, especially small and medium-sized
South American enterprises. The International finance Corporation, an
affiliate of the World Bank, is mandated to invest in essentially private
undertakings. Its equity participation has proved a catalyst for private
foreign development in the LDCs. Though it invests in productive enter-
prises without government guarantees, the host country does hold a veto over
its participation.
The Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin America (ADELA),
established in 1964, is a private organization financed by up to a maximum
of $500,000 capital from a number of companies and banks. An apostle for
private investment in Latin America, it takes minority equity positions,
arranges public offerings, and has generated about a billion dollars of
investment, of which only a small portion has come directly from ADELA.15
ADELA does not seek special concessions, operating on the principle that
dependence on special privileges not available to local businessmen even-
tually will cause problems.16 ADELA pursues an active divestiture policy.
The Andean Common Market
The creation of a Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)
was initiated some years ago with considerable enthusiasm. LAFTA has
since stalled, and attention turned to the possible creation of smaller
regional groups. The May 1969 agreement to create an Andean Common Market
(ANCOM) was a fruition of this effort. Initially conceived to include
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, to date Venezuela
has not committed itself to membership. A scheduled reduction of tariffs
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between ANCOM states was approved, and special provisions were granted
Bolivia and Ecuador, the smallest and least industrialized members.
The drafting of an ANCOM investment code has placed into sharp focus
the potential role of foreign investment in the economic development of the
Andean group. Although Colombia and Ecuador forced the exclusion of petro-
leum or mining from the code, and a distinction was added to separate new
from existing investment, the ratified code places severe restrictions on
the use of foreign capital in ANCOM countries.
The principal provisions include: 18
1. All new foreign investment and existing companies wishing to
enjoy ANCOM concessions must gradually relinquish at least
51% ownership; the transition period is fifteen years in Chile,
Colombia, and Peru, twenty in Bolivia and Ecuador.
2. The state has first purchase option; ventures in which the
government has equity and a part in decision-making may be
exempted from the divestiture requirements.
3. Firms exporting more than 80% of their production do not have
to divest, but they then would not benefit from ANCOM concessions.
4. New foreign investment is prohibited in banking, insurance,
internal transport, advertising, radio and television broadcast-
ing, publishing, and local marketing.
5. Acquisitions will be permitted only under rare circumstances.
6. No payments will be made for intangible technology.
7. Restrictions will be imposed on foreign borrowing in local
markets.
8. A 14 percent ceiling will be established on annual remittances.
9. The right of repatriation of capital is not guaranteed.
The enactment of this code resulted in OPIC suspension of further
investment insurance in ANCOM countries pending clarification of the
practical implications of these new regulations. The reaction of the
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American business community has been less equivocal. Howard C. Peterson,
a prominent banker and one-time adviser to the White House during the
Johnson administration, dismissed the ANCOM countries as not attractive for
further foreign investments.19  The Council of the Americas received
responses from fifty-six member companies in a poll on the ANCOM investment
code; fifty-one members replied that they would be negatively affected,
thirty-nine "very negatively" and twelve "mildly negatively." 20 The members
reported that, because of the ANCOM code, they had postponed fifty definite
and thirty-four potential projects in ANCOM countries; the geographic
distribution was: thirty-seven in Colombia, twenty-two in Peru, twelve in
Chile, nine in Ecuador, and four in Bolivia.2 1  They expressed greatest
concern with the "fade out" provisions. ADELA officials were quoted as
saying that where the basic structure of private enterprise was put in
jeopardy, private investment would not continue.22
The creation of ANCOM flows in good measure from the assumption that
regional integration is a requisite for future industrial development. In
part influenced by the European Common Market experience, one might
envisage major new investment opportunities in a regional common market.
This indeed may prove correct, but it is necessary to analyze the nature
of the market and the possible centers of production. The ideological
thrust of the ANCOM investment code, together with uncertainties in its
administration, complicates the task of economic analysis.
The great difference that exists between South American countries
*To the casual observer it seems surprising that fifty-six U. S.
companies had been on the verge of making so many new investments in the
ANCOM countries.
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reflects the varying levels of industrial development already achieved by
the individual countries and not the specialization in particular areas
23based on the country's natural resources and other factors. The five
ANCOM countries have a combined population more than double that of
Argentina, though its combined GNP is $2 billion less that Argentina's
GNP.
ANCOM's initial launching has not been auspicious and its future
success is not yet assured. While Venezuela's entry would strengthen
its economic base, the possibility remains that some of the charter members
will become disenchanted with ANCOM strictures. The government that
assumed power in Bolivia in August 1971, for example, already has sought
modifications in the ANCOM investment code ratified only two months
previously.24
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Chapter 5
THE RATIONALE, RISKS, AND REALITIES OF INVESTMENT INSURANCE
OPIC Brings a New Style
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 provided for the creation of the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The corporation, with six
of its eleven directors to be selected from the private sector, was
charged with the responsibility of the "Investment Insurance Program,"
which previously had been administered by AID's Office of Private Resources.
Even before the January 19, 1971 Executive Order officially creating OPIC,
new operating guidelines began to emerge during the administrative hiatus
before OPIC President Bradford Mills formally assumed command. By mid-
1971 OPIC had clearly established a personality distinct from the program's
previous AID image.
OPIC's top positions are staffed almost entirely by businessmen,
whose concern is focused far more intently on profitability, credibility,
and minimizing risk than specifically on the process of economic develop-
ment in the developing world. An immediate imperative, when OPIC's con-
tinued existence is not assured, is a business-like administration. The
present management team is competent especially when measured against AID
standards. Its members capitalize on the direct responsibility legislated
to OPIC by Congress.
OPIC inherited a high risk portfolio and unprofessional bookkeeping
procedures from AID. Initially operating more from basic instinct than
from careful, and time consuming, analysis, OPIC swiftly established its
authority to say no. Whereas traditionally "political expediency" tele-
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grams from embassies carried considerable weight in the loosely organized
State-AID command structure, OPIC presented a far stiffer back to such
pressure. Moreover, since ultimate responsibility for new investment
insurance rested with a board of directors, rather than with a government
agency, OPIC occupied a unique position.
OPIC, in fact, is a semi-autonomous government organization. Depend-
ent on Congressional funds and Congressional review, OPIC also cannot be
divorced from the government establishment. OPIC's president serves as
chief executive officer. The Administrator of AID is chairman of the
OPIC board, which includes three other representatives of government
departments, and, perhaps more important, OPIC can not ignore the State
Department or AID. The Treasury Department, through representation on the
board and independently, also plays an influencial role.
OPIC formally seeks political guidance from State, and AID also
has the right to express official opinions. If State or AID strongly ob-
jects to further insurance in a particular country or to a specific project,
it is extremely unlikely that OPIC would exercise its legal prerogative to
override such advice. 2 If State is equivocal, the absence of the poli-
tical protection provided by State approval almost certainly would prompt
the OPIC board not to act unilaterally. 3 A strong State endorsement is
treated as a precedent to OPIC's serious examination of any project.
During the first seventeen months of OPIC's "informal" existence, nearly
20 percent of the insurance applications received were rejected.4
It is not clear the extent to which the Executive Branch can
influence OPIC. On Taiwan, for example, President Nixon has made
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clear his policy to encourage continued U. S. investment in this island.
This political priority was accorded extraordinary treatment within the
State Department, and it seems unlikely that OPIC would stand firm
against the President's expressed wish. 5
Though only one of the executives currently with OPIC played a
major role in the drafting of OPIC legislation, the effort by program
administrators to alter the nature of the "Investment Insurance Program"
is not a recent development. Internal guidelines established new
operating criteria in several vital areas, and subsequently OPIC con-
sciously sought to advertise its insurance facilities throughout the
business community.
Chile Forces the Pace
OPIC's efforts to rationalize gradually the investment insurance
program were upset by the expropriations initiated by the Allende Govern-
ment in Chile. Through the first twenty-three years of the "Investment
Insurance Program" claims totalling $4,100,000 had been paid,6 part of
which had been recovered by subsequent U. S. Government action. Potential
claims from Chile threatened to drain all available insurance reserves and
still require a request to Congress for additional funds.
Against available reserves of about $100,000,000 OPIC received a
series of claims which included:7
International Telephone and Telegraph $108,500,000
Kennecott Copper Corporation 84,600,000
Cerro Corporation 14,200,000
The Anaconda Company 11 ,000,000
The Anaconda Company 159,000,000
$377 ,300 ,000*
*This is an approximate figure. The Anaconda
claim for $159,000,000 is disputed by OPIC.
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Although legal action and negotiations are not yet concluded, it
is possible that OPIC will face claim settlements on the above in excess
of $200,000,000. Anaconda, in a decision that is difficult to comprehend
when viewed apart from the corporate psyche of this unusual company,8
elected stand-by coverage totalling $235,400,000 in 1969. Although
Anaconda has initiated legal action in an effort to redress this situation,
it appears virtually certain that its decision to skimp on an insurance
premium, perhaps in the expectation that President Frei would be politi-
cally unaffected by the expropriation of IPC in neighboring Peru, will
cost its shareholders grievously.
Other possible expropriation claims from American companies in
Chile, while less spectacular, are not unsubstantial. OPIC could have
received valid claims for nearly $400,000,000. Because of Anaconda's
peccadillo and the possibility that some companies can work out arrange-
ments that, at a minimum, will postpone the requirement for OPIC compensa-
tion,* OPIC is not faced with the immediate prospect of technical
insolvency. OPIC currently is requesting from Congress additional reserves
of $85,000,000.9
The Rationale for Encouraging U. S. Private Investment in LDCs
Some thoughtful observers contend that all U. S. private invest-
ment abroad may not be in the national interest.10 A high OPIC official,
in riposte, commented that the "theory of national interest" was not
worth discussing. He was aware of President Nixon's October 25, 1971
*According to press reports, the Allende regime has agreed to honor
its debt of $84,600,000 to Kennecott. The fulfillment of such a pledge,
however, is not assured.
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statement,' "I am a strong believer in the importance of private investment
to the development process. It is the most effective way of transferring
the financial resources, technology, and management skills which play so
vital a role in stimulating development in the poorer nations." 12
A January 1972 State Department telegram reiterated that it was
United States Government policy that private investment facilitates econo-
mic and social development in the LDCs. The telegram continued that
impeding the flow of private capital would deter the growth of countries,
pointing to Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan as examples of LDCs that had
flourished with private foreign investment.
The OPIC charter calls for the fostering of "private initiative and
competition," adding the caveat that, to the greatest degree possible,
the balance-of-payments objectives of the United States should be
furthered.13 In the mid-sixties, a major businessmen's group reported that
many U. S. executives believed it necessary to cut back drastically on
U. S. foreign aid and channel funds into U. S. foreign investments. About
the same time an AID source was quoted as saying, "A project's contribution
to the economy of the host country is not, as the ["Investment Insurance
Program's"] statute intimates, the sole or even primary criterion. ,14
OPIC is a pragmatic organization. It does not have a large economic staff
doing research in the abstract and essentially isolated from the hard
day-to-day business decisions. To date the study of the economics of
development has proved an imprecise science. Clear measurement of the
impact of foreign investment, both on the investor country and on the
recipient, also requires far greater empirical effort. One helpful con-
tribution to the literature is a recent Harvard Business School study
70
commissioned by the Department of Commerce which concludes that in the
aggregate, U. S. direct foreign investment in manufacturing creates,
rather than destroys, jobs in the United States. It further states that
most such direct investment is apparently "defensive," designed to sub-
stitute for an export market that otherwise would be lost.15
It is difficult to quantify the economic, social, and political
impact of all forms of U. S. direct investment abroad. In Latin America,
for example, it would be difficult to deny the strong impact of U. S.
investment on manufacturing; sales of U. S. affiliates increased 147 percent
to $6,548,000,000 between 1957 and 1966, accounting for 37 percent of
Latin American manufactured goods. 16 A study commissioned by the
Council of the Americas seeks to demonstrate that, during the period
1965-1968, U. S. private investment bolstered Latin America's balance of
payments position by an average of $8.55 billion annually, including
estimated foreign exchange savings from import substitution.17
Impact of Investment Insurance on U. S. Direct Investments
In the abstract there is no precise way to j dge how much U. S.
investment would be made in the absence of investment insurance. Accord-
ing to a senior OPIC executive, in the early 'sixties there was little
concern about investment insurance. Now, however, he contends that it is
treated like casualty insurance and that few companies, given the
opportunity, would forego it.18 Another OPIC official states that, in
many cases, such as development of natural resources in Latin America,
investment insurance is the critical factor.19
A series of polls, conducted over the past decade by various
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organizations, suggest the enhanced importance of investment insurance.
In 1948, at the start of the "Investment Insurance Program" in Europe,
business seemed generally opposed to the restricted insurance available. 20
Five years later, according to a Department of Commerce survey, none of
366 respondents considered investment insurance a critical factor in the
investment decision process.21 In 1958 a small Harvard Business School
survey of companies utilizing investment insurance resulted in 20 percent
of the respondents saying that they would not have made that particular
investment without insurance.22 The proportion increased in another
survey conducted several years later. 23
In 1971 a responsible businessmen's information clearing house,
commissioned by OPIC to conduct a survey based in part on OPIC lists,
reported 329 responses to a question on the necessity of political risk
insurance as follows: 24
necessary 5.8 %*
desirable but not essential 47.6 %
not important 5.9 %
not reported 1.0 %
Over 75 percent of the respondents were engaged in manufacturing.
More recent, though limited, empirical evidence would seem to
contradict the conclusions of the surveys cited above. This writer con-
ducted a series of interviews in January 1972 with senior officers of
major U. S. companies; all the companies have significant involvement in
Spanish-speaking South America; all carry at least some insurance with
OPIC; and several have major claims outstanding against OPIC. None of
those interviewed expressed the view that the availability of investment
Because of rounding, the responses do not total precisely 100.0%.
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insurance was critical to their company's investment decision-making
process. The following statements accurately reflect the tenor of their
personal opinions:
The decision to invest is made apart from investment insurance
The fundamental question is, is it a good long-term investment?
Investment insurance may be an element in the actual terms of the
project, but it is not on the burner. [My company's] pro
forma policy is to insure. The insurance is low cost, South
America fluctuates regularly, so why not? U. S. business generally
invests for the long term. If risk doesn't stand up to financial
analysis, then, insurance or no, why bother?25
The investment decision is made apart from the availability of
investment insurance. If it seems to be a good investment, then go
ahead. If insurance is available, its cheap so take it. [He]
doubts that insur nce encourages much investment that otherwise
wouldn't be made.26
The decision to invest is made by companies, then details,
including financing and investment insurance, are considered. [He]
doubts that 5 percent of current investments would be lost by
absence of insurance. In high risk areas where issuance of new
insurance has been suspended for many of the same reasons business
would be hesitant to invest.27
The decision to invest or not is taken apart from insurance.
If the investment is highly risky, we won't go in. Insurance does
not compen gte for the investment. Insurance is 0. K. if it is
available.
It appears that when convertibility is most in question, the
government won't approve insurance. Under such circumstances, [he]
is not sure that [his company] would incur a major initial risk,
insurance or no. [His company] has a major technological advantage
and is not particularly involved in the insurance program. [He]
had meant to look into the possibility of self-insuring. One
drawback is that in the event of one big loss where they could have
been covered, this would bring embarrassing questions from the
boss.
There were also statements about the delays in processing the in-
surance, the extensive paperwork on small investments that don't make it
worth the effort, and difficulties in obtaining approval from the host
government.
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It seems possible that in many instances companies that have
become accustomed to the availability of investment insurance have an
unconscious tendency to bias their formal written comments on the subject
of risk insurance. In possible contrast, a book in the mid-sixties
devoted entirely to the foreign investment decision process did not
once mention investment insurance; the author relied extensively on
personal interviews.30 While it is possible to point to isolated cases
where unquestionably the investment would not have been made without
insurance, the availability of investment insurance does not appear to
have been the critical factor in the great majority of positive investment
decisions in recent years.
The existence of other national investment insurance programs at
times is given as evidence that such a program has significant value and
that, to compete abroad, the United States must stay in the forefront with
investment insurance. While there may be validity in these arguments,
other countries can use the same arguments more forcefully about the U. S.
program. The United States has written about ten times more insurance
than has been issued by all the other national programs. The U. S. program
is by far the oldest, and the others generally seemed to be patterned
after it. Many of the other programs began only recently, the Japanese
and Germans have the largest exposure of these ten nations. 31 The
Japanese propose a ten-fold increase over the coming five years, with
particular focus on ensuring access to mineral resources.32  Representa-
tives of the various programs meet regularly to exchange views, and there
does not appear to be a strong sense of competition between them.33 The
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United States remains the only country that from the outset of its pro-
34
gram has insisted on host country approval before issuance of insurance.
The Japanese may now require similar approval.
There has been no successful effort at quantitative analysis to
date to test for possible correlations between investment insurance and
U. S. direct investments abroad. It appears unlikely, given the nature of
the data, that such a test would prove conclusive. It is interesting to
note, however, that in Peru, where the host government only approved of
convertibility insurance, between 1965 and 1969 a substantial amount of
new U. S. investment was recorded. On June 30, 1971 there was $81,884,399
in convertibility insurance outstanding.
There are also some interesting, though not necessarily conclusive
observations that can be drawn from the Mexican situation. Mexico has a
history of expropriations prior to World War II and has established tight
controls over foreign investors. To date it has not participated in the
"Investment Insurance Program." From 1950 to 1970 U. S. direct investments
in Mexico rose from $415, to $1,466 million, an increase of 253 percent.
By far the greatest increase occurred during the 'sixties, a period when
investment insurance was rapidly expanding in South America. During the
same twenty years U. S. direct investment in Spanish-speaking South
America rose only 175 percent, including a major investment in Venezuelan
petroleum.
U. S. Obligations to Direct Investment Abroad
U. S. companies abroad have varied recourse to American support and
assistance when confronted with possible expropriation or inconvertibi-
75
lity. Apart from the investment insurance program, potentially perhaps
the most forceful U. S. support comes from the government's bilateral
position against expropriation without prompt and adequate compensation.
On January 19, 1972 President Nixon restated U. S. policy, spelling out
the punitive measures at hand in the event that countries did not respect
the requirement for compensation of expropriated properties.35 The
President's statement, however, also indicated considerable flexibility
in treating with specific situations when good faith or overriding U. S.
interests could be demonstrated. 36 Pressures in Congress for a tougher
stand against expropriations prompted the President to issue this policy
statement in an effort, only partially successful, to block unilateral
congressional action.
Nixon's announcement underscored the principle embodied in the
Hickenlooper Amendment of 1962, which legislated the suspension of
bilateral assistance to any country which, within six months of expro-
priating American property, had not taken "appropriate steps" to pay
adequate compensation.37 The failure to make prompt settlement following
the expropriation of a Brazilian subsidiary of ITT was an immediate cause
of this amendment.38 At the time Secretary of State Dean Rusk, speaking
in opposition to the amendment, told the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations that the United States could not "afford to stake its interests
in other countries on a particular private investment in a particular
situation . . . [Such] a provision would create severe complications in
our relations with other governments. 39 Then- Under Secretary Averill
Harriman stated his opinion more graphically: "You can't dictate to
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people. If the United States threatens to take away aid under these
conditions [e.g. Hickenlooper Amendment], there is not a country in the
world that would not tell us to go to hell.''40
With the exception of Ceylon, the Executive managed to avoid
application of this amendment. In October 1968 the Peruvian expropriation
of the International Petroleum Company, with no apparent intention to pay
compensation, posed a difficult problem for President Nixon in subsequent
months. He did not wish to enforce the Hickenlooper Amendment as his
first significant policy move in Latin America, but nor could he openly
flout the law of Congress. When the application of the Hickenlooper
Amendment appeared inevitable, Nixon dispatched John Irwin (later
appointed Under Secretary of State) to negotiate with the Peruvians.
Though no significant change in the Peruvian position was obtained, the
cut-off deadline was extended, then the matter was postponed indefinitely.
Three years later the issue remains in suspense and no regular AID
program functions in Peru, but Nixon had skillfully avoided application
of this amendment.
The amendment was viewed with distaste by many North Americans and
Latin Americans. Gordon Levin, commenting on it in 1963, stated: "This
conflict between the needs for structural change in Latin America and the
needs of American business as a system of power may be irreconcilable . .
Since corporation ideology is entrenched in the heart of the Alliance for
Progress by Section 620(e), the chances are that these business values
will exert a final veto on the social change this country will be willing
to underwrite in Latin America." 41 While this seemed an overstatement,
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these sentiments were echoed in Latin America. Following Nixon's action
on Peru, many lawyers believed that the Hickenlooper Amendment was dead.42
Subsequent Congressional activity and Nixon's recent policy statement on
expropriation have resurrected its spirit.
In addition to the explicit threat to suspend financial assistance
to defend the interests of American business (in fact it seems unlikely
that such action would have the desired effect), the United States is
employing the Internal Revenue Service to provide partial compensation
to some expropriated companies. Congress voted special tax relief for
companies wholost assets in Cuba. Recently the IRS ruled that Anaconda,
Kennecott, and Cerro Corporation may treat their uncompensated Chilean
losses as ordinary rather than capital losses, thus permitting an offset
for some years against taxable earnings.43 A critical issue is the year
in which such deductions are permitted. While it seems unlikely that
Standard Oil of New Jersey, which has written off $85 million of total
IPC assets valued at $170 million during negotiations, can benefit from a
similar tax ruling, since petroleum taxes are treated in a special fashion,
this principle would seem to offer potential relief to a number of other
companies.44
Unforeseen Benefits from Investment Insurance?
There are ramifications in legislation and government rulings that
the drafters understandably may have failed to consider. Several such
exist in the provisions for investment insurance. The expectation was
that the existence of such insurance might deter precipitate action by
the host country. Evidence of this to date is not persuasive.45 There
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are isolated instances, however, which suggest that the insurance may
legally be employed in ways not initially intended.
If one considers the situation of Anaconda immediately after
President Frei's election, it seems surprising that the U. S. company
did not relinquish part ownership of its major operating mines. Instead,
in return for a tax reduction, it agreed to expand significantly its
copper producing facilities. The new investment was covered by insurance,
which easily could have been maintained current. Such insurance served
to extend a continuing return on a previous investment, and the extra-
ordinary rise in copper prices added handsomely to Anaconda's profits.
Had the investment insurance been operative, Anaconda well could have
benefited from these additional profits; it could have obliged the U. S.
Government to bear the cost for the new investments which had occasioned
the Chilean Government to provide tax concessions; and it could have taken
advantage of an IRS ruling to recover further assets. Though of course
the situation is hypothetical, such a policy could have resulted in maxi-
mization of Anaconda's profits in an expropriation environment, to the
financial detriment of the U. S. Treasury.
In the case of ITT, its Chilean subsidiary had long been functioning
on the margin. When presented with the opportunity of an expropriation
claim, it legally could protest the action, resist efforts to strike a
deal, then bill the United States for $108,500,000 which, in fact, is
substantially less than the value ITT places on its Chilean assets. In
other countries U. S. companies, when faced with government encroachment,
have often negotiated with the host country in good faith in an effort to
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salvage the bulk of their assets and maintain a local viability. Indeed
in Peru, where ITT was not covered by investment insurance, ITT recently
negotiated a complicated arrangement whereby it accepted minimal direct
compensation and invested in other local enterprises.
Certainly such an alternative is distasteful to a company that has
invested in good faith, as has ITT, but the possibility remains that the
existence of investment insurance can make a U. S. company less willing to
seek a pragmatic local solution to a difficult situation.46 In such a
circumstance, the United States may actually contribute to a company's
intransigent position. It appears likely that one small American company
in Chile, producing a quality product overpriced for the market, may have
welcomed, even encouraged expropriation. It carries investment insurance
and stands a good chance of collecting on its claim.
The Role and Responsibility of U. S. Business
The United States Government generally is ignorant about the
sensitive details of American business operations abroad. In part
this is because embassy personnel generally don't understand business and,
not infrequently, give the impression that there is something distasteful
about the profit motive. U. S. businessmen, who often deal with embassies
on routine matters, sense this professional reserve and often view
embassy personnel as a pampered and generally ill-informed group.
This lack of mutual respect and of easy rapport is unfortunate,
since the embassies have the implicit responsibility to support U. S.
business endeavors overseas. In difficult situations the U. S. repre-
sentative too often is obliged to accept a businessman's "facts" and
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associate the prestige and credibility of the United States with them.
On the occasions where an individual business's activities may jeopardize
the legitimate interests of other U. S. businessmen and those of the
United States, it is regrettable that a more open interchange has not
been established.
While the great majority of American companies abroad do credit
to their country, the folklore about occasional bribery, political
involvement, and slick business practices is not without foundation. In
Chile, for example, Chileans were well aware that Anaconda had financed
members of a local political party in years past. This activity influenced
informed Chilean opinion, and it most certainly contributed to the hos-
tility displayed towards Anaconda in the delicate negotiations and
ultimate pressures for expropriation in recent years.
Perhaps the embassies should not and cannot monitor U. S. business
activities abroad. This could become a legitimate function of U. S.
business associations abroad. It seems unfortunate that business appears
to enjoy the indiscriminate umbrella of U. S. official representation,
when full knowledge of specific situations might suggest a different
posture. Almost no career officer in the Foreign Service feels
authorized to investigate situations in which misdeeds of an American
company appear in evidence. Though it may only be an illusion, these
officers believe that if forced to a showdown by Congressional action,
the State Department would not defend their efforts.
In time of difficulty, American companies do stay in touch with
the State Department. Though company executives visit Foggy Bottom,
their real political "clout" clearly rests elsewhere. Any substantial
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corporation can count on support from friendly Congressmen, and the
shadowy world of Washington influence provides leverage which, in
specific cases, can dictate the State Department's position.
The Council of the Americas, founded with the active support of
David Rockefeller,is an organization financed by over two hundred
companies associated with Latin America. A person associated with the
Council states with sincerity that the Council senses U. S. Government
"hostility" towards business and suggests that this might be explained in
Galbraithian terms; namely that intellectuals and businessmen are opposed
in vying for power. 47
The Council provides useful services to the business community
and is an articulate spokeman for a point of view that deserves a wide
audience. It is possible, however, that business is the only major
interest group that consistently presents its viewpoint on Latin America
to the Executive and to the legislative branch,48 and thus by default
Council members may exercise inordinate influence. Similarly, when
Council representatives journey to various countries, host nationals may
be awed by the professional and economic resources represented within the
Council. This in turn can lead to exaggerated local sensitivities, as
when the Colombian Minister of Development accused a visiting Council
group of unsolicited interference in Colombia's internal affairs. 49 In
fact, this "incident" occurred over a difference of opinion on the Andean
Foreign Investment Code during a discussion in which Council members were
representing the legitimate interests of private foreign investors.
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The Assessment of Political Risk for Foreign Investments
Surprisingly little attention has been given to serious analysis
of the risks of expropriation and the propensity to expropriate private
foreign investment. At least one American company employs a probability
approach to political risk investment appraisal in which the potential
profit-reducing efforts of political alternatives are measured. 50
Literature on the subject is almost nonexistent, and this statistical
approach to analyzing investment risks still encounters considerable
skepticism among company executives. This type of analysis is rather
expensive, and it is too sophisticated to be applied on a casual basis.
While the petroleum companies are well known for their attempts to
anlayze and predict political changes in areas of interest, few if any
other industries commit a similar magnitude of funds in an effort to
conceptualize and forecast political risk. ITT, for example, despite its
multinational nature, is so transfixed by the current necessity to better
each previous quarter's earnings that efforts to formulate sophisticated
projections divorced from short-term operations have modest priority
within the organizational structure. 51 A brief inquiry into the fore-
casting abilities of several major companies suggests that seat-of-the-
pant instincts are the rule. Ofttimes an interested executive,
employing an informal information network, will make a recommendation on
the risk feasibility of a particular proposal. A recent survey of multi-
national companies concludes that they too seldom undertake a systematic
evaluation of political risks and their consequences for company opera-
tions.52
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Political instability is not necessarily the same as political risk,
and what entails risk for one firm, may not affect another. There are
often short-term advantages in doing business with a dictator or an auto-
cratic regime. Agreements, once negotiated with such governments, gene-
rally are handled discreetly. By contrast, democratic governments must
be more sensitive to public opinion, and political pressures may necessi-
tate actions which are in the economic interests of neither the host
country nor the foreign company. In view of the political cycles that are
common in South American countries, it seems unlikely that special
advantages obtained from a particular regime will normally be upheld by
successor governments, however legal the agreement may appear. A common
situation is for a regime in financial trouble to provide attractive
incentives in an effort to encourage significant foreign investments.
Local ground rules are often changed unilaterally shortly after the influx
of foreign capital that such "incentives" generate.
When discussing political risk insurance it is important to be
clear about terms. Confiscation is not a wide-spread phenomenon. There
are even relatively few incidents of expropriation world-wide,
especially when measured against total foreign investment, and the majority
have occurred since 1945.53 There are a relative handful of expropriations,
outside the Communist countries, where more than token compensation has
not been paid. In Latin America historically the psychological repercus-
sions of possible expropriation on a potential foreign investor may well
have alarmed him unduly.53 Recent events in South America, however,
suggest that the dangers of expropriation have become a valid concern for
84
responsible foreign investors.
There can be a sharp difference between direct confrontation lead-
ing to the takeover of an entire foreign-dominated industry and the wide
spectrum of tactics available to a government desirous of targeting one
nationality or one particular company. Expropriation is fundamentally
a political act which may appear to be irrational if viewed in purely
economic terms. A moderate government may feel obliged to expropriate
foreign investment in order to appease the political opposition, an
expropriation in a neighboring country may set off a "ripple" effect; or
expropriation may serve as an emotional release to what seems to be
almost a random event or circumstances, either international or internal.
The emotional effect of expropriation is reflected in the remark of a
conservative Chilean to the Allende Government's expropriation of U. S.
copper companies who said: "I'm glad that Chile finally has a government
with guts." 55 The underlying emotion almost certainly is a deep resent-
ment against the dominant role long exercised in Chilean affairs by the
United States.
Convertibility, though also covered by political risk insurance,
may prove to be an entirely different issue. While the blocking of
foreign exchange transfers can be politically motivated, it often
results from a chronic balance of payments deficit or from mismanagement
by an inept, though well-intentioned government. The terms of
convertibility generally are negotiable, if the affected company has the
patience and the wit to sort out the situation.
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Possible Keys to an Expropriation-Prone Environment
There are some general institutional or structural characteristics
that assist in identifying the existence of an expropriation-prone
environment. These are not absolute, nor are they necessarily applicable
without modification throughout distinct geographic regions. 56
A list of economic activities vulnerable to expropriation, ranked
from most likely to least likely, is set forth below:57
1. Public utilities; communications; the exploitative sector
(plantation or extractive agriculture, mining and crude
petroleum and natural gas production)
2. The service sector (distribution and trade, banking and
finance, insurance, etc.)
3. Non-plantation agriculture and agriculture-related services.
4. Non-basic manufacturing sector (basic industries probably
would be reserved as a public enterprise.
In ranking nations according to their propensity to expropriate,
as measured by GNP and human resource characteristics, empirical analysis
has suggested the following order, ranked from high to low propensity.58
"1. Level II ('partially developed') nations with a Composite
Index of Human Resource Development significantly greater
than Per Capita GNP.
2. Level II ('partially developed') nations.
3. Level III ('semi-advanced') nations.
4. Level I ('underdeveloped') nations.
5. Level IV ('developed') nations."
Other rankings of expropriation exposure, giving the highest and
lowest potential exposure range include: in marketing, a fragmented com-
pany in a freely competitive sector to a world-wide marketing monopoly;
in ownership characteristics, a joint venture with home government
participation to a joint venture with the host government as partner. 59
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Activities with a high transfer of technology assume an added protection
against expropriation.
The preceding guide lines do not particularly assist in extimating
the vulnerability of a specific proposed investment. Neither are the
1-3 year political projections produced by State Department country
directors of great relevance to the predictive process. It may be
possible, however, to develop a general feel for the ranking and pace of
change for a particular area, according to these criteria. Applied to
Spanish-speaking South America, they place into sharp focus the struc-
tural change towards foreign investment that is occurring and suggest a
high potential of expropriation and other inconveniences for the more
exposed foreign investments.
It is difficult to affix a specific value to risk. Most U. S.
firms have a high aversion to risk and take out insurance even when
political risk is perceived as moderate or low.60 The more experienced
petroleum companies, denied risk insurance, have developed a sang-froid
in dealing with turbulent situations. During the period of new investment,
their bargaining position is at a peak, and this often is reflected in the
terms of their exploration and exploitation agreements. Once the major
new investments are completed and production commences, the bargaining
advantage shifts to the host government. The companies recognize and
tend to accept this phenomenon, though if profits are squeezed too badly
output may even fall and confrontation is likely.
Despite the huge sums at stake, no one had developed a refined
model which permits the application of quantified correlations to the
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probabilities and costs of various levels of political risk. Indeed,
it would even be difficult to hypothesize the amount of direct compensa-
tion expected, following expropriation, much less the size and nature of
financial relief provided by the U. S. Government. Thus, at present
one must rely on instinct and experience, sharpened, one hopes, by the
establishment of rough parameters developed through careful analysis.
Tailoring Investment Insurance by Sector and Country
OPIC is fully aware of the problems of coverage and exposure posed
by the investment insurance program and has moved swiftly to adapt to
changing circumstances. The eligibility criteria modified in July 1970
to deal with large or sensitive projects demonstrates OPIC's competent
and pragmatic response to a difficult problem.61 Special treatment was
ordered for any project of approximately $25,000,000 or more, and for
high risk sectors including utilities and other public facilities,
protected industries, and natural resources. It has long been the policy,
with a few exceptions, not to consider insurance for oil exploration and
production facilities because of the size and distinct nature of the
petroleum industry. Though legislation permits insurance to be issued
for twenty years, OPIC established a normal limit of twelve years for
high exposure projects, and this limitation subsequently has been
extended to other sectors. Moreover, as a matter of administrative
policy, OPIC is instituting declining coverage, on both initial new
investment and retained earnings; coverage for 90 percent is permitted
the first year, with a sliding scale down to 50 percent by the twelfth
year.
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This policy of restricting the exposure time is consonant with,
though not identical to, the common practice of major New York banks in
their foreign operations. The First National City Bank's policy, with
62
few exceptions., is to lend abroad for a maximum of five years. The
Citibank seeks additional collateral when this policy is breached. The
Citibank seeks to cover its risk in part by limiting direct exposure
in any one country and by sharing major loans with other banks. OPIC is
similarly concerned with country and sector exposure. Though it cannot
legally renege on insurance issued by its predecessor agency, it is quick
to apply the "less developed friendly countries" provision of the 1969
legislation to suspend processing of further applications for countries
experiencing difficulties with the United States.
For many years investors, for a minimal fee, were permitted to
retain the option to switch from "stand-by" to current status on issued
insurance. This option seemed to provide companies almost a free ride
until local circumstances might merit payment of a somewhat higher annual
premium in order to activate full coverage. Anaconda's experience
rendered such a strategy less attractive to client companies. This
stand-by provision is no longer offered to new applicants.
The establishment of premium rates is a situation for which there
is no useful historical precedent. OPIC officials are fully aware that
their fee schedule is not based on historical experience. In fact, were
such the case, the fee for the first two decades would have been
infinitesimally small, then a high speed computer would have been nece-
ssary to calculate a rapidly changing rate over the past year. Obviously
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this would be absurd, and no more scientific than the current system.
Granted that a single rate, raised from 1.125 to 1.5 percent annually for
full coverage, is not sophisticated, changes in the terms of newly
written insurance in fact represent a rate change.
The suggestion that OPIC adopt the Export-Import Bank's system of
assigning one of four risk categories to countries has superficial
appeal. Ex - Im, however, is using common banking criteria to
determine commercial risk, while the determination of political risk is
highly subjective and instinctive. An annual risk ranking of countries
would be exceedingly difficult to defend, given the imprecise criteria,
and in any case current events may or may not determine the risk of an
investment over time. Publication by the U. S. Government of such a
ranking certainly would spark political controversy in those countries
designated in the upper range of the risk scale.
An alternative is to establish diversified rates by investment
sector. This is more feasible to administer and, assuming that the
rate structure for investment insurance may influence potential investors,
this provides policy flexibility to OPIC administrators. In fact a
similar policy currently is being pursued.
In the aftermath of the Chilean expropriations, OPIC has stated
that "the insurance reserve was not intended by the Congress to cover
large extraordinary losses, such as when a country, heavily endowed with
foreign investment, nationalizes, as a matter of policy, all private
investment without compensation in disregard of international law and
practice."63 Whether this indeed was the intent of Congress will become
clearer in coming months. One issue to be considered is the criteria for
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subsidizing investment insurance on other than commercial grounds.
The Evaluation of Expropriated*Properties
There are no broadly accepted criteria which can easily be applied
to expropriated properties for the purpose of establishing compensation.
President Nixon referred recently to the need for "adequate and swift
compensation."64 This is consonant with the official U. S. position at
the time of Ceylonese expropriations: "The established principle of
international law is that in evaluating vested property all elements or
interests of value which make up the total worth of the property must be
evaluated and compensated. '65 In response to 1953 expropriations in
Guatemala the State Department declared that "just compensation" means
compensation which is "prompt, adequate, and effective." 66
Developing countries often dispute the U. S. definition of "just
compensation." Some countries contend that expropriation initiated for
"reasons of public benefit or social interest" merit radically different
compensation consideration. 67 Efforts to deduct from the compensation
price of an expropriated property penalties for alleged "excess profits"
and exploitative practices is becoming more common. The position of
developing countries towards payment of compensation often is shaped by
pragmatic considerations of ability to pay.
In actual practice, the State Department often serves as 'honest
broker" in expropriation cases, seeking to obtain maximum compensation
for its client. In the case of Bolivia's 1937 expropriation of Standard
Oil of New Jersey's properties, the company's initial claim for
$17,000,000 was settled for $1,750,000. Lump sum confiscation settlements
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negotiated by the State Department with Eastern European countries often
totalled a mere fraction of outstanding claims, but full commerical
relations, including in some cases bilateral aid, are being maintained
with these nations.
As a practical matter it is impossible for the State Department
to make an official evaluation of expropriated property, although the
Internal Revenue Service may be obliged to establish a figure for tax
purposes. There is normally wide variation between the western
commercial concept of ongoing market value and what a U. S. company
ultimately feels compelled to accept. It is unrealistic to view
expropriations simply as an economic phenomenon. Specific circumstances,
including the political environment, the record of the expropriated firm,
and the dependence of the host country on international capital impact on
the valuation process. Ignoring this fact, some academics have
experimented with the application of capital budgeting to the problem,
with predictably absurd results. 68
Efforts to establish international machinery for the arbitration
of expropriation disputes have served little useful purpose to date.
The United States has found little value in the arbitration provisions
normally included in bilateral investment treaties. Though Argentina
permitted the assistance of a World Bank adviser to facilitate the
resolution of a compensation dispute,69 in 1964 Latin American countries
unanimously voted against a plan, proposed by the World Bank and
supported by the United States, to establish international arbitration
machinery.70 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment
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Disputes (ICSID), established under World Bank patronage, in 1971 had
been ratified by fifty countries. The first dispute was brought before
it early in 1972. No South American country was included among those
who had either ratified or signed the ICSID agreement.
The fact that OPIC can acquire the assets of an expropriated
U. S. firm as part of the claim agreement places the United States in
the position of negotiating directly with host countries over compensa-
tion for these assets.
The current formal U. S. position on what under international law
constitutes "just compensation " is clearly stated and narrowly defined.
Once the U. S. Government directly negotiates compensation agreements
with foreign countries for its own account, this could establish common
law precedents which weaken the traditional U. S. official position.
This is particularly relevant in an area in which there are no commonly
accepted principles of international law which lend themselves to
effective enforcement.
OPIC also faces a difficult problem as it negotiates settlements
of insurance claims by American companies. Misconduct by the company, if
proved by OPIC and shown to have affected materially the expropriation
action, could provide the basis for a discounted settlement. Perhaps
more germane, OPIC currently is placing great importance on the "material
aspects" of an insurance application. These aspects include the
anticipated economic and social impact of the project and the physical
nature of the investment. OPIC clients are receiving statements with
their annual bills reminding them that they are responsible for fulfilling
the "material aspects" which provided a basis for the approval of
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investment insurance. Since many foreign investment projects change
substantially from the planning stage to actual implementation, it is
possible than grounds are being established for OPIC negotiating
leverage in the event that claims are filed. Current and past OPIC
officials hold conflicting views on the legality of such a negotiating
technique.
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Chapter 6
NEW STRATEGIES AND A NEW RELATIONSHIP?
The President, in 1940, [recounted] that when he had visited
Rio de Janeiro in 1936, President Getalio Varga had told him that
the bus lines in the capital were owned in Montreal and Toronto
and has asked: "What would the people of New York City do if the
subways were all owned in Canada?" Roosevelt's reply had been:
"Why there would be a revolution." The President went on to say
that he thought that, when foreign capital went into a Latin
American country, the country should gain control of the utility
or other business after the investment had been paid off in a
period that might be set at twenty-five or thirty years. Thus,
the country could look forward to gaining ultimate control of
utilities and perhaps other foreign-financed corporations through
having what Roosevelt called 'an option in the equity.'l
New Modes: Joint Ventures and "Fade Outs"
OPIC officials believe that "new modes" for investment can be
found for South America. Variations on the joint venture are included in
this category. In their view these should be encouraged as being less
risky.2 The businessmen's advisory board to OPIC, however, believes that
it is too soon to plunge into this area and recommends that OPIC maintain
a "reactive" posture.3 Although virtually every form of ownership arrange-
ment has experienced expropriation, this has been a rare event for
joint ventures. 4 OPIC already enjoys legislative authorization to insure
joint venture
Some of the reticence among the business community in 1965 towards
minority participation in joint ventures apparently has subsided. One
recent survey of most of the Fortune "500" companies reported strong
approval for joint ventures as general policy, though with somewhat less
enthusiasm for minority interest.6 Another extensive survey reported
that two-thirds of the respondents held the view that joint ventures
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reduced political risk. 7
Senior executives of various major U. S. companies interviewed
in New York preferred not to generalize about the attractiveness of
joint ventures. All sorts of arrangements were theoretically possible,
but the key lay with the individual project. In a small operation there
probably would not be sufficient profit to spread around. Management
was seen as a critical problem, and some of those interviewed believed
that managing less than a 100 percent-owned operation may require more
sophisticated managers, since responsibility is divided. Using profit-
ability as the principal yardstick, they agreed that a minority interest
in a large operation, such a petrochemical complex, probably would be
worth the headaches.
Their comments on joint participation with the host government
were mixed. One executive, soured by host country intervention in the
technical aspects of business, strongly opposed local government involve-
ment. He illustrated how a government partner, even with minority
interest, could exercise a veto power and could apply political criteria
to such matters as price increases and profit levels. 8  In the same
country Kennecott enjoyed an excellent minority position relationship
with the Chilean Government. The American manager was exceptionally
effective, and President Frei had great confidence in his judgment. This,
however, did not prevent renegotiation of Kennecott's terms with the Frei
administration, then expropriation by All.ende. Iron ore companies in
Venezuela resisted participation with the government, in part because of
the government's insistence on marketing guarantees.9 A survey of com-
panies that had entered into a joint venture with the government of a
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LDC indicated that a slim majority of them would repeat such an exper-
ience. 10
Joint ventures in the politically sensitive extractive industries
may prove viable. A major new mining venture generally requires at
least $100 million initial investment, and the World Bank and other
international institutions normally don't loan capital to governments for
developing mineral resources. 1 Moreover, successful production requires
access to international markets. An excellent arrangement for the
government and foreign mining company could include payment in product,
rather than encounter bookkeeping problems and "high profit exposure."
Such an arrangement should minimize the usual risks of disputes over
refining, pricing, and marketing.
The draft State/AID legislation on the creation of OPIC included
a provision for $30 million in equity to permit OPIC to participate in,
and profit from, joint ventures. This would have permitted OPIC to play
an active role in the supervision of management. The House deleted this
provision. 12
The Peterson Task Force Report recommended that OPIC, in combina-
tion with other countries, encourage international joint ventures.13 In
the belief that U. S. capital is especially vulnerable in Latin America,
some American firms have sought a European or Latin American protective
umbrella. 14 Multinationality has provided some protection against
expropriation. It was the cohesive element behind the creation of ADELA.15
Though ADELA's participation in the Northern Indiana Brass Company did
not prevent its expropriation by the Chilean Government, ADELA did
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receive favored treatment. 16 ADELA has also served as a middle man
between the Allende regime and several expropriated U. S. companies.
Of the "new modes" of investment currently receiving attention,
the most controversial is the "fade out" or divestiture. Proposals on
the subject have circulated for many years. Professor Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan envisages a 12-15 year sliding-scale joint venture at the end of
which the foreign investor should have recovered his capital and an ade-
quate profit and, at the discretion of the host government, have no
further involvement. The requirement for the "trembling" function - the
possibility of personal loss which, in turn, spurs a better performance -
would oblige the investor to commit some of his own funds, even if the
arrangement were a management services contract.17 A more extreme pro-
posal by Professor Albert Hirschman for U. S. divestiture in Latin
America recommends that public U. S. funds support such a scheme. 18
Senator Jacob Javits, a prime mover in the creation of ADELA and OPIC,
pred icts "politically explosive implications in the U. S. Congress"
were such a disinvestment program initiated.19  Reactions from the
American business community are generally unfavorable, at time voci-
ferously so.20
A Multinational Approach?
In the early sixties the idea of a multinational investment in-
surance program, funded perhaps through the World Bank, received consi-
derable attention.21 Even today the idea of World Bank involvement
in investment insurance is under review. OPIC, consonant with
legislation which encourages it to share its insurance risk, recently has
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signed a reinsurance agreement with Lloyds of London as a one-year experi-
ment. While this arrangement might encourage the impression that OPIC
is now running a commercially viable operation, in fact Lloyds' partici-
pation is extremely limited. Lloyds will reinsure half the expropriation
claims in each country, up to $7 million per country and a global total
of $250 million.22 Recent expropriations and Chile as a country are
excluded. Detailed information on the reinsurance fee has not been made
public.
While discussions on a broader multinational insurance scheme con-
tinue intermittently, more exciting are the possibilities for massive
intermigling of international funds in LDC investment projects. 23
Countries that might accept a financial confrontation with the United
States, West Germany, Japan, Italy, France, or the United Kingdom would
be reluctant to challenge the group collectively. The mingling of
capital from banks and businesses, portions of which could be insured
by individual countries, would seem an effective method of doing busi-
ness in a developing country. Capital goods export guarantees for com-
mercial banks would keep any possible confrontation at the commercial
level, and few LDCs can afford to lose access to short-term suppliers'
credits.
A New Style for U. S. Businessmen Abroad
U. S. business has lost many opportunities abroad because of a
lack of flexibility. In the 'sixties it was doing what was necessary in
the 'fifties, and the same time lag exists today. The greatest short-
coming of U. S. business today in South America is probably the paucity
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of managers who can deal effectively in the local environment. Their
own colleagues criticize them for being parochial, tongue-tied in a
foreign language, comfortable in a foreign ghetto, and prone to favor
social stability and financial orthodoxy.
The American corporation in South America must learn how to plan
for "selective impermanence." 24 Risk taking should be the gut of their
profession, and this requires an understanding of today and tomorrow,
not only yesterday.
A series of interviews conducted with executives of companies that
had been expropriated reveal an insensitivity to or ignorance of, the
25
impact of the company's foreign exchange operations on the host country.
This failure to view their company from the host country's point of view
has proved costly. Generally these companies have conducted appalling
public relations efforts abroad. By contrast, the two companies with
outstanding public relations received markedly preferential treatment
after expropriation.26 Business Latin America recently provided its
readers good advice on how to conduct abroad: 27
1. Act, don't react; establish firm
lines of communications with the
host government.
2. Demonstrate that private investment
a positive tool for development.
3. Avoid the "we-they' syndrome.
South America's Suspicions and Aspirations
South America's sensitivities towards the United States are a
reality, and they will remain an important factor for years to come. A
profound and probably very painful readjustment is in process in South
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America. The United States may be able to exert influence on the peri-
phery, but it can neither dominate or direct these forces. 28
The common assumption in South America is that U. S. business and
government are intertwined, and that this combination has tremendous
economic influence. While South Americans cannot compete, they yearn to
reposte against past injustices, imagined or not. Theory and emotion are
essential South American weapons, and these often appear to be irrational
to the insensitive American observer. In South America a love-hate
relationship exists with the United States, and it will take time and
patience and understanding to avoid a psychological confrontation.
There are "good economic reasons for anticipating increasing con-
flict between the goals of national development and the foreign invest-
ment community, even after the latter has thoroughly purged itself of
the excesses that marred its early career."29 The coming years may
alternate between openness to foreign influences and periods of nation-
alism and withdrawal. 30
Fundamental U. S. Interests Reassessed
Investment insurance is only a policy flowing from a basic
strategy, and until a U.S. strategy towards South America is thought
through and clearly formulated, it is sterile to seek to establish a
series of detailed priorities on peripheral issues.
This insurance may prove to be unnecessary, even an impediment
complicating the sorting out of a mature new relationship between the
United States and South America. Current insurance commitments form
part of a heritage of deep involvement that reaches back for generations.
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Formerly the "Free World'' struggle, traditional U. S. security interests,
the exclusion of potentially hostile extraterritorial powers, plus outlets
for surplus capital formed the liturgy of U. S. interests in South
America.31 These trite phrases do injustice to the genuine basis for
U. S.-South American mutual interests that does exist.
U. S. assistance may have facilitated the export of considerable
American capital. As aid levels diminish and the threat of denying such
aid becomes increasingly hollow, the flow of further private investment
may be affected. The question whether the United States Government
should underwrite the flow of private investments that otherwise would
not be considered viable almost assumes philosophical overtones. The
past pattern has been to encourage major investments to "friendly"
regimes, then weather the eventual storm as the local political scene
experience cyclical change.
It would be more fruitful to adopt a lower profile, let mutual
interests develop, then slowly permit a new relationship to evolve. The
United States enjoys an edge in capital goods and technology --
resources that will be in urgent demand throughout South America. Recent
Mexican history demonstrates how long fissures can take to heal, but
time has proved generous, even to new private investment there.
There are major investment opportunities in other areas of the
world; it would be undignified and unrewarding were the United States
to attempt to force its attentions upon a reluctant South America. South
America, where the "Investment Insurance Program" once flourished, may
prove fatal to OPIC. Businessmen are openly speculating whether OPIC
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will pay off outstanding insurance claims, and the prospect that Congress
will commit the "full faith and credit of the United States" to still
greater expropriation exposure without a searching re-evaluation of pri-
vate foreign investment is unlikely. Once the presidential election
campaign terminates, it may be possible to sort out those priorities upon
which a strategy towards South America can be constructed.
South America does not represent, in present detail, the environ-
ment extant in other developing areas. The structural change in
treatment of foreign capital, however, in some aspects is evident in
other regions. The South American experience, the psyche of the gringo
apart, probably is a good indicator of likely future trends elsewhere.
Whether they become clear in two or twenty years will depend largely on
the internal dynamics of the region concerned.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE "INVESTMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM"
The similarities between the evolution of the "Investment Insurance
Program," the Penn Central, and Federal housing subsidies are striking.
They all started with shoddy staff work. Their managements either sought
to conceal or did not recognize the potentially calamitous implications of
their actions. Their crises broke on the public with little forewarning.
The insurance program started modestly in 1948 in support of
Marshall Plan countries. It provided limited insurance coverage, required
100 percent reserves, and had a $15,000,000 annual ceiling. By June 30,
1971 it issued coverage against the political risks of nonconvertibility,
expropriation, war, and insurrection. It was only available for the
developing countries. "The full faith and credit of the United States"
substituted for significant reserve requirements. Contingent liabili-
ties ("expropriation exposure") totaled more than $3.5 billion, two
thirds of which were assumed in the preceding six years.
Claims paid during the program's first twenty-three years
totalled $4,100,000. Then expropriations in Chile resulted in claims of
nearly $400,000,000, far exceeding OPIC's resources even after exclusion
of Anaconda's disputed claims. Protracted negotiations and the probability
of stopgap arrangements protect OPIC from the immediate prospect of
technical insolvency. The economic nationalism which led to the Chilean
seizures, however, will not soon subside. Expropriations are likely to
occur with increased frequency, and OPIC is carrying a high risk world-
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wide portfolio.
OPIC President Bradford Mills, in testimony before the Senate
Foreign Operations Subcommittee on March 1, 1972, described one of his
corporation's two objectives as follows: "to stimulate economic and
social progress through U. S. private investment in developing countries
which officially welcome it but whose political or economic uncertainties
otherwise discourage U. S. investors." The implication that, in the
absence of political risk insurance, the investments covered by the OPIC
portfolio would not have been made is untrue. The great bulk of these
investments would have been made in any event, and the availability of
cheap political risk insurance simply provided a convenient anchor to
windward.
The objectives against which insurance applications are evaluated
and, thus, the actual purposes of the "Investment Insurance Program" are
unclear. Congress authorized OPIC to undertake "to encourage and support
only those private investments in less developed friendly countries and
areas which are sensitive and responsive to the special needs and require-
ments of their economies, and which contribute to the social and economic
development of their people." OPIC does not appear constrained by the
language of this legislation. Though projections related to developmental
impact are included in the insurance application, OPIC apparently does not
scrutinize them carefully.
It is possible that virtually all private investment contributes
to the development process. This conclusion is implicit in President
Nixon's introductory letter included in OPIC's first annual report. Were
111
OPIC involvement limited to the encouragement of investment that, in the
absence of political risk insurance, would not be made, then the
establishment of screening criteria would require data currently not
available to OPIC. Strengthening the U. S. balance-of-payments position is
another possible purpose. OPIC's president recently described to senators
the great potential markets of tomorrow and the critical natural
resources available in the developing world.
Only when the purposes of political risk insurance are clearly
defined can results be measured against objectives. The program provides
a huge potential public subsidy to American businesses operating in less
developed countries. "Insurance" is a misnomer for the OPIC service
provided to U. S. investors. Insurance agents distinguish between risks,
which are statistically probable and statistically predictable, and
hence insurable, and uncertainties, which are neither, and the bearing of
which traditionally has been the function of the entrepreneur. Business-
men welcome the opportunity to limit their possible losses from uncertain-
ty. The Executive has an obligation to demonstrate that government
acceptance of enormous contingent liabilities serves valid public
interests.
In the 'sixties businessmen considered political risk insurance
a bargain, a fact demonstrated by the alacrity with which they sought
coverage. Perhaps the Executive, faced with Congressional determination
to cut back direct foreign economic assistance, may seek to rationalize
these bargain rates as a substitute form of aid. In 1965 Marina von
Neumann Whitman, currently a member of the Council of Economic Advisers,
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concluded that the "Investment Insurance Program" provided only modest
leverage for public assets. This remains true today.
Political risk insurance is somewhat akin to fire insurance. No
responsible businessman expects to make a profit from it, but it helps
reduce losses when misfortune strikes. There are possible nuances to
investment insurance, however, that the drafters of authorizing legisla-
tion could not foresee. The placing of government insurance on new
investments might extend the flow of dividends from older, non-insurable
investments. The existence of insurance can make a U. S. company less
willing to negotiate a pragmatic local solution in a difficult situation.
A further dimension is that the U. S. Government, through this insurance,
tends to underwrite the activities of American businesses abroad. The
government generally is ignorant of the sensitive details of such business
operations, and can find itself financially committed to a company that
has acted irresponsibly.
OPIC, officially created in January 1971, inherited a large
insurance portfolio from AID. While it is possible to debate the wisdom
of the acquisition policies employed by the loosely organized State-AID
command structure within which "political expediency" was a common
justification, the legal obligation to honor this insurance was unassail-
able. OPIC initiated operations with modest reserves to cover contingent
liabilities in excess of three billion dollars.
Established as a semi-autonomous government agency with direct res-
ponsibility for its activities, OPIC quickly displayed a businessman's
acumen in approaching the management of investment insurance. Higher
fees, reduced coverage, special treatment of high risk situations,
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probationary reinsurance of part of its portfolio, and tighter management
control were evidence of the distinct OPIC style. The expropriations in
Chile began during OPIC's first six months. The Senate, historically
reluctant to approve House-initiated expansions of the "Investment
Insurance Program" moved quickly to monitor OPIC activities.
In 1973 there will probably be a full review of investment
insurance by Congress. Given the strong opposition of leading senators
such as William Fulbright and Mike Mansfield, an attempt to withdraw
OPIC's authority to issue further insurance is likely. If the effort to
scuttle OPIC fails, persuasive arguments can be made to reshape drasti-
cally existing programs.
Large U. S. investments in extractive industries are particularly
vulnerable to expropriation. Bilateral U. S. Government insurance does
not reduce significantly the political risk, and massive multinational
reinsurance of such investments seems unlikely. The United States should
encourage the massive intermingling of international funds in large pro-
jects. International consortiums, with equity or loan capital from
various developed countries, could also arrange capital export credits
from major commercial banks. A mixture of investment insurance and
credit guarantees would further broaden the base of such an enterprise.
Investment insurance on lower profile projects should be issued
against strict criteria of need. In those cases where an investment is
contingent upon the availability of political risk insurance, approval
should depend upon clear demonstration of the U. S. public interest. The
term and degree of coverage can be tailored to the specific situation.
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While a ranking of political risk by country is neither desirable
nor technically feasible, a staggered fee schedule can be established in
various sectors such as mining, manufacturing, turnkey operations, and
management services contracts which include some capital investment. This
could permit flexibility to encourage "new modes" of investment.
There is a clear danger that, as the Export-Import Bank perceives
businessmen to be its clientele and acts accordingly, OPIC also will
instinctively tend to identify with the business community. Major public
subsidies have developed in agriculture, housing, and elsewhere without
an effective accountability of the utility of such investments. This
should no longer be permitted in the "Investment Insurance Program."
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